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I. INTRODUCTION: THE VITAL TASK OF PLANNING FOR 
THE WORST 
A capabilities-based approach to contingency planning offers important 
opportunities to strengthen both Homeland Defense and Homeland Security. The 
Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have 
already begun moving beyond traditional threat-based and scenario-based planning 
methodologies toward a more capabilities-based approach, but require embracing this 
concept more in order to counter challenges in developing contingency plans against 
current threats to the US Homeland. Additionally, given the critical responsibilities of 
state and local governments in Homeland Security, this planning approach might be 
applied far beyond the Federal government. This thesis examines ways that a specialized 
capabilities-based planning process might be applied to Homeland Defense and 
Homeland Security, and applies the proposed methodology to two case studies: the US 
Navy Component of US Northern Command and the New York City Fire Department.   
Because terrorist threat actors may be both cunning and adaptive, relying on 
surprise to overcome security measures, military and security planners must embrace a 
more flexible, comprehensive, and comprehendible approach to contingency planning – a 
method based not on threats or scenarios, but on capabilities. The process of contingency 
planning and resource allocation poses one of the greatest current challenges for those 
responsible for protecting the US Homeland because of the severity and diversity of the 
threats and the required timeliness of any defensive operations and security responses. 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security recognizes this by having “manage risks 
and allocate resources judiciously” as guiding principles and goes on to declare, “because 
the number of potential terrorist acts is nearly infinite, we must make difficult choices 
about how to allocate resources against those risks that pose the greatest danger to our 
homeland.”1 At this task, military and security planners have struggled to develop a 
comprehensive and comprehendible planning system using existing approaches of 
traditional threat-based planning that focus on the “who” and scenario-based planning 
                                                 
1 U.S. Department of Homeland Security. National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHLS), July 
2002 (Washington, DC.: US Government Printing Office, 2002), 3. 
1 
that address the “what.” To present senior decision-makers with timely and effective 
contingency plans, planners need to transition to a more flexible and dynamic 
capabilities-based planning method that focuses on the “how” and can frame required 
capabilities and overcome uncertainty concerning the threat. 
 
A. WHY PLANNING MATTERS  
One of the main points learned during contingency planning since 9/11 is that 
Homeland Defense (HLD) and Homeland Security (HLS) both require a new 
comprehensive and comprehendible planning process.2  For military planners, the lack of 
an accepted framework and vision of the threat facing the US Homeland emerged as 
fundamental issues during Homeland Defense planning prior to the start of the War in 
Iraq. During this crisis action planning, planners continually faced the same questions: 
“What is the threat?” and “What tasks do you need us to do?” When it was time for the 
resulting plan to be briefed, a new set of questions emerged: “What are you doing about 
threat X?” “Why do you need resource Z?” and “How did you determine that Z is 
enough?” These pointed questions continue as the Department of Defense adjusts its 
planning process to address and counter threats of asymmetric attacks on the US 
Homeland from both terrorist groups and hostile nation-states.3 A similar challenge faced 
Homeland Security planners since 9/11 because of the fact that terrorist groups’ main 
goal is always surprise and shock.  
The traditional purpose of contingency planning is to provide information, 
analysis, and recommendations to senior decision-makers to assist in the vision and 
expression of potential courses of action to meet future crises. This paper will not address 
long-range budgeting and organizational planning such as military force structure and 
                                                 
2 In this manner, the attacks of September 11th were not only a wake-up call to a more dangerous 
world, but also triggered an immediate re-thinking of responses to terrorists and terrorism. As the 
impressions of 9/11 and technological proliferation have changed the strategic environment, leaders and 
planners at every level of the government wrestled with how to meet the terrorist threat. “We cannot defend 
America and our friends by hoping for the best,” states the current National Security Strategy, “so we must 
be prepared to defeat our enemies’ plans, using the best intelligence and proceeding with deliberation.” The 
act of “proceeding with deliberation” identifies the current organizational stumbling block for many 
academics, strategists, and planners who try to match plans and capabilities with perceived threats. 
National Security Strategy of the United States (Government Printing Office, September 2002), v. 
3 The importance of these emerging threats and DOD’s increasing role are addressed in the GAO 
Report to Congress, Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Address the Structure of U. S. Forces for Domestic 
Military Missions (United States General Accounting Office, July 2003), 1. 
2 
procurement, nor will it address tactical planning in small units and organizations that 
focus on operating procedures to meet specific tasks. Both of these, while important, 
bracket the current deliberate operational planning challenge in Homeland Defense, as 
both military organizational capabilities and tactical competency appear to be sufficient 
to counter the threat if applied at the right time and place. The current problem is to 
develop a plan to utilize these strengths in an effective manner against a thinking 
opponent who seeks surprise and shock- i.e., what to prepare to do at the right time and 
place.  
The military equivalent of this type of contingency planning is the traditional 
military act of “campaign planning.” For military planners, campaign planning is defined 
as the process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders 
“translate national or theater strategic and operational concepts through the development 
of campaign plans” with the resulting campaign plan being a “plan for a series of related 
military operations aimed at achieving a strategic or operational objective within a given 
time and space.”4 For plans to protect the Homeland, the “campaign plan” encompasses 
the emergence of a threat, its detection and characterization, and its eventual defeat. This 
type of HLS / HLD contingency planning is problematic as organizations struggle to 
develop plans for both synergistic and synchronized preventative activities required 
during periods of known but ambiguous threat when a broad operational strategy is 
required to produce plans. This makes “campaign planning” the most rewarding focus for 
analysis as a major challenge for HLS / HLD planners because it requires developing a 
synchronized and effective contingency course of action to counter an evolving and 
diverse threat environment.  
As an organizational system, key shaping decisions for the planning process 
include determining the degree and timing of senior decision-maker involvement. As 
“time is the most vital factor” in planning, active and early involvement of military 
                                                 
4 Definitions from Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary 
of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001. (Washington, DC.: US Government Printing Office, 
2001), 59-60. 
3 
commanders in making shaping decisions are the most vital factors in planning success.5 
This is especially true of the challenges of military planning for Homeland Defense, 
which place a burden on military leaders to make contingency plans without clear 
intelligence on threats and clear forecasting on threat options. To succeed, planners must 
therefore embrace and overcome the environment depicted in the 2001 Quadrennial 
Defense Review, which described a strategic environment where little is known for 
certain about precisely where and when a threat will strike and “adapting to surprise – 
adapting quickly and decisively – must therefore be a condition of planning.”6 
This challenge in protecting the Homeland will continue as the Department of 
Defense (DOD) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) adjust planning 
processes to address and counter threats of asymmetric attacks on the US from both 
terrorist groups and hostile nation-states. Because of this lack of certainty and 
fundamental differences in the structure of the contingency addressed, traditional war-
planning does not seem to offer a model to copy for Homeland Defense planning. 
Whereas traditional planning can be used against a predictive enemy such a “rogue 
states,” asymmetric threats offer no such certainty. A new planning approach called 
“capabilities-based planning” has gotten a lot of attention inside DOD as the solution to 
planning uncertainty, including the unique challenges of homeland defense planning. 
 
B. DEVELOPING A CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING METHODOLOGY 
To address the perceived growing complexity in the global security situation for 
the United States, DOD is advocating “capabilities-based” defense planning to achieve a 
broad portfolio of military capabilities that will perform robustly in uncertain future 
environments. As first formalized in the 2001 DOD Quadrennial Defense Review, a 
capabilities-based approach “focuses more on how an adversary might fight rather than 
                                                 
5 “To a conscientious commander, time is the most vital factor in his planning,” warned Korean War 
commander General Matthew Ridgeway, “by proper foresight and correct preliminary action, he knows he 
can conserve the most precious element he controls, the lives of his men.” As General Ridgeway and 
countless other military commanders have recorded, pre-campaign planning often is a critical component of 
victory. A current fundamental tenant in military doctrine is that “planning for the employment of military 
forces is an inherent responsibility of command.” Quotes from Department of Defense, Joint Publication 5-
0: Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, 13 April 1995. (Washington, DC.: US Government Printing 
Office, 1995), I-1. 
6 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Government Printing Office, 30 September 2001), iii. 
4 
specifically whom the adversary might be or where a war might occur.”7 To accomplish 
this broad goal, current DOD capabilities-based planning concept focuses on strategic 
planning and is expressed in the newest Defense Planning Scenarios used to predict 
future contingencies. Strategic documents at DOD (e.g. Strategic Planning Guidance, 
Contingency Planning Guidance, and National Military Strategy) have started adopting 
this concept by focusing planning “on how adversaries will fight in the future rather than 
on which specific adversaries we may fight.”8 While not formalizing any definition of 
what the words “capabilities-based planning” mean (much less how to do it), each 
document addresses capabilities-based planning as a goal and the way of the future as a 
mechanism to overcome the nebulous nature of the strategic environment. 
The genesis for this approach to planning was strategic thinking at the RAND 
Corporation’s National Defense Research Institute. The author of much of the conceptual 
work behind the current push for capabilities-based planning is Paul K. Davis at RAND. 
Davis defines capabilities-based planning as “planning, under uncertainty, to provide 
capabilities suitable for a wide range of modern-day challenges and circumstances, while 
working within an economic framework.”9 Though focused on DOD force structure 
planning rather than campaign planning, Davis believes this new approach to Defense 
planning is not antithetical to threat-based planning, nor does it solely signify a shift in 
emphasis from threat to capabilities. Rather, it satisfies the need for increasing variability 
in Defense planning cases and in the key planning factors for friendly and enemy forces, 
to better account for uncertainty. For this approach, the question “who is the threat” is 
addressed as a reworded question “what could the threat DO” to allow exploration of a 
much broader range of eventualities.10 This helps planners define capabilities needed 
rather than individual numerical solutions to narrowly defined, highly scripted individual 
                                                 
7 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Government Printing Office, 30 
September 2001), iv. 
8 National Military Strategy 2004 (13 May, 2004), 13. 
9 Paul K. Davis, Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission Systems Analysis, 
and Transformation (RAND Corporation Publication MR 1513, 2002), 1. 
10 According to DOD Defense Planning Scenario development, “Capabilities-Based Planning is a 
method of Defense planning that examines a wide range of variability in factors, in order to achieve a broad 
portfolio of military capabilities that will perform robustly in an uncertain future environment.” This 
unclassified quote is from a classified DOD briefing dated July 2003 from the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense that accompanied the staffing of the Defense Planning Scenarios.   
5 
cases because capabilities-based planning treats the threat as a continuum, within 
prescribed limits, rather than as a set of single-point values.  
A working definition of “Capabilities-Based Planning” modifies these initial 
DOD and RAND characterizations in order to specifically address the requirements of 
Homeland Defense and Homeland Security contingency planning for a flexible process 
that resembles a conceptual “menu” approach to planning. A capabilities-based planning 
process can therefore be defined as an analytical process of assessing means, capacity, 
and likelihood of all potentially hostile actors to strike with an emphasis on recasting 
intelligence uncertainty into a modular “menu” of potential threat capabilities. This 
planning process would result in a solution framework emphasizing “building blocks” of 
capabilities that could be tailored to meet persistent general threats or a specific emerging 
threat.11 By bracketing potential hostile capacities with assumptions of likelihood 
facilitates narrowing planning into manageable (and often affordable and acceptable) 
realms, amorphous threats can be defined and codified to enable planners to develop a list 
of required capabilities and required authorities and policies to counter anticipated enemy 
actions while being inherently flexible to changes in the strategic threat environment. 
Thereby, each new piece of new intelligence further refines what threat capabilities exist 
and any “actionable intelligence” would trigger the execution of pre-planned defense and 
security capabilities already identified and enabled. 
I intend to use a concept development approach to clarify the definition of 
“capabilities-based planning” and propose a concept of how to develop a capabilities-
based plan for Homeland Defense and Homeland Security missions that will overcome 
the inherent planning challenges of ambiguous threats and expansive contingencies. In 
the first chapter, I will first model threat assessment and contingency planning as a 
Decision Support System to identify required inputs, desired outputs, and critical success 
criteria for a contingency planning process. The second chapter will apply metrics of an 
effective   planning   method  to  two planning  processes,  the  traditional  “threat-based”  
                                                 
11 This “building block” approach is addressed as a key element in capabilities-based planning in Paul 
K. Davis, Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission Systems Analysis, and 
Transformation (RAND Corporation Publication MR 1513, 2002), 4. 
6 
approach of military planners and the “scenario-based” method currently in vogue with 
security planners, to demonstrate shortfalls of these two approaches and the need for a 
new planning process.  
The third chapter will begin by examining the history of capabilities-based 
planning to try to best define what the term means. Then, a “capabilities-based” or “how” 
approach to threat assessment will demonstrate an effective method to focus on how the 
threat could attack or act, more than on who are the threat actors. Then, this chapter will 
describe a process to perform “capabilities-based” planning and demonstrate how this 
approach can effectively solve current challenges in planning for Homeland Defense and 
Homeland Security. This capabilities-based planning process will discuss how to identify 
forces, tasks, and enablers required to counter any likely potential threat capability. 
Additionally, this chapter will demonstrate how a capabilities-based plan facilitates risk 
versus resources decision-making by senior leaders by presenting a comprehensive and 
comprehendible format of threat and friendly capability linkages. The fourth chapter will 
include two case studies to demonstrate how a capabilities-based plan could be developed 
by a military HLD command and a civilian HLS organization to reveal practical inputs 
and outputs of this approach.  
Finally, I will conclude with recommendations based on an assessment of the 
strengths and weaknesses of capabilities-based planning when applied to HLD and HLS 
operational planning. These recommendations are: 
 
• DOD should halt the use of a traditional threat-based planning process for 
Homeland Defense contingency planning 
 
• Both DOD and DHS should adopt a capabilities-based approach for threat 
assessments for Homeland Defense and Homeland Security planning 
 
• Both DOD and DHS should adopt a capabilities-based methodology for 
Homeland Defense and Homeland Security contingency planning 
 
• Both DOD and DHS should leverage a capabilities-based methodology to 
formalize linkages between planning and resourcing for Homeland Defense 
and Homeland Security contingency planning 
 
7 
• Both DOD and DHS should leverage a capabilities-based methodology to 
formalize linkages between planning and exercises for Homeland Defense and 
Homeland Security contingency planning 
 
• Both DOD and DHS should leverage a capabilities-based methodology to 
increase senior decision-maker involvement in Homeland Defense and 
Homeland Security contingency planning 
 
The goal for this paper is an effective, comprehensive, and explainable planning 
process that overcomes the inherent challenges in contingency planning against 
asymmetric threats. A capabilities-based planning process will be defined as an analytical 
process of templating means, capacity, and likelihood of all potentially hostile actors with 
an emphasis on recasting intelligence uncertainty into a modular “menu” of potential 
threat capabilities in order to develop preventative response packages based on means. 
This conceptual approach has the advantage of being applicable to amorphous threats, 
flexible for evolving threats, and adaptable for diverse threats. This innovative planning 
process will demonstrate a solution framework emphasizing “building blocks” of 
capabilities that could be tailored to meet persistent general threats or a specific emerging 
threat. Thereby, each new piece of new intelligence further refines what threat 
capabilities exist and any “actionable intelligence” would trigger the execution of pre-
planned defense and security capabilities already identified and enabled. A capabilities-
based approach to planning will emerge that will be very effective for Homeland Defense 
and Homeland Security planning in today’s strategic environment because it has the 
advantage of being applicable for amorphous threats, flexible to evolving missions, 




II. CURRENT CHALLENGES IN HOMELAND DEFENSE AND 
HOMELAND SECURITY PLANNING 
This chapter will identify significant and unique challenges of Homeland Defense 
and Homeland Security planning. Contingency planning will be developed (and modeled) 
on the Information Technology concept of a “Decision Support System.” Looking at 
military contingency planning as a Decision Support System (DSS) will isolate required 
input and desired output to assess various planning approaches as a process. From this 
assessment, unique planning challenges emerge that establish measures of effectiveness 
for any Homeland Defense or Homeland Security planning system. This chapter will then 
assess the advantages and challenges of “threat-based” and “scenario-based” planning 
methods to show that neither “threat-based” nor “scenario-based” planning effectively 
addresses the current homeland defense and homeland security planning challenges.  
The complex and amorphous post-9/11 threat environment created by the terrorist 
threat and the unprecedented nature of overlapping Federal, state, and local 
responsibilities and jurisdictions create unique challenges when planning military and 
non-military security operations inside the United States. Traditional planning processes 
appear poorly structured to meet these challenges of HLD and HLS contingency planning 
because of the diverse and amorphous threat and the need for multiple options for 
execution that prevent any ability to forecast potential moves and counter-moves. Unlike 
regional military planning against hostile nation-states, the challenge of assessing 
asymmetric threats prevents the development of “most likely” and “most dangerous” 
courses of action. Additionally, only the broadest guidance to thwart the enemy’s plans of 
attack is given to planners due to the absence of detailed analysis of opponents’ decision-
making systems and a clear understanding of threat tactical and operational goals.  
9 
The problem with these traditional approaches is the inability to produce a single 
course of action option to the decision-makers that can accomplish the broad and diverse 
preventive missions while countering the diverse threat capabilities available to various 
hostile actors. With multiple inputs, traditional planning conceptually breaks down 
because of its inability to present viable courses of action for the commander to assess 
and select and is poorly structured to provide any certainty on resources required and 
risks assumed. Additionally, because the current threat is not solely contingency-based 
like a war in Korea but rather a steady state of terrorist threat, HLD and HLS planning 
needs to be constantly cyclic and remove the clear traditional distinction between 
planning and execution. Because intelligence on the threat is constantly changing and 
potential methods of attack are consistently evolving, any HLD or HLD plan must be 
inherently flexible and conceptually be similar to a rheostat approach to readiness 
wherein preventative measure can be adjusted based on the latest intelligence assessment. 
 
A. WHAT AN EFFECTIVE PLANNING PROCESS WOULD LOOK LIKE  
Looking at military contingency planning as a Decision Support System (DSS) 
isolates required input and desired output to assess planning approaches as a process. 
This is not a new or unique approach to assessing the planning process as the military has 
become enamored with Information Technology and Information Management.12 To 
assist military commander’s with decision-making and the management of on-going 
events, many versions of military DSS have been developed recently, though the majority 
are based on using computer displays to track and manage information required for 
situational awareness and rapid decision-making.13 But by focusing on the planning 
process rather than possible uses of emerging information technologies, the requirements 
and challenges of HLD and HLS contingency planning can be viewed as a DSS in order 
to determine how these process problems can be overcome. From this assessment, 
capabilities-based planning emerges as an effective DSS for HLD and HLS contingency 
planning because it provides decision-makers a “menu” of options to counter the 
spectrum of threat courses of action. In contrast with traditional campaign planning, 
                                                 
12 This usage of a corporate concept like DSS by military thinkers is not new. Because of fundamental 
similarities in senior-level executive activities between corporate America and the military, it is only 
natural that military commanders would look toward cutting edge information management strategies to 
facilitate executive decision-making that is inherently non-programmed, novel, consequential, and non-
repetitive. This paper uses the definition of “executive decision making” from Hugh J. Watson, George 
Houdeshel, and Rex Kelly Rainer, Jr. Building Executive Information Systems and other Decision Support 
Applications (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 1997), 47-48. 
13 An example of this is the Commander’s Advisory System for Airspace Protection (CASAP) DSS 
prototype developed for the 1 Canadian Air Division/Canadian NORAD Region Air Operations Center. 
This program manages and displays information and provides a series of tools to the military decision-
makers to assess proposed courses of action. See Micheline Belanger and Adel Guitouni. A Decision 
Support System for COA Selection. Defense Research Establishment Valcarier, World Wide Web,   
http://www.dodccrp.org/2000ICCRTS/cd/papers/Track5/049.pdf.   
10 
capabilities-based planning also offers a more flexible and dynamic process that can 
frame required capabilities and overcome uncertainty concerning the threat. 
When looking at this planning process, military planning may be considered a 
DSS, but just what is a DSS? This question needs to be answered up front due to the lack 
of a shared definition of what constitutes a DSS. Even some recent Information 
Technology text books admit that there is no real consensus on what characteristics and 
capabilities constitute a DSS given the varied IT tools labeled as DSS and the wide 
divergence of tasks for which they are used.14 While some common references like 
Introduction to Information Technology base their definition of DSS on a “computer-
based information system” approach, others take a more expansive approach.15 For this 
paper, DSS will be defined more broadly as “an interactive system that provides the user 
with easy access to decision models and data in order to support semi-structured and 
unstructured decision-making tasks.”16 The key here is the focus on decision-making and 
the executive decision-maker’s needs rather than focusing on the information systems 
and computer systems that are tools in this process. 
Applying the definition and concept of a DSS to DOD contingency planning, the 
military planning process emerges as a DSS that focuses on providing information, 
analysis, and recommendations to senior decision-makers to assist in the vision and 
expression of potential courses of action to meet future crises.17 To further match the 
irements of Homeland Defense planning, contingency DSS concept with the requ
                                                 
14 Richard E. Potter, R. Kelly Rainer, Jr., and Efraim Turban. Introduction to Information Technology 
(Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), 363. 
15 Richard E. Potter, R. Kelly Rainer, Jr., and Efraim Turban. Introduction to Information Technology 
(Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), Glossary G-5. Decision Support Systems and the study of 
decision-making as a DSS has been around for almost 40 years, beginning in 1965 with computer based 
model-oriented DSS and currently composing the Web-based DSS of today. Much of the DSS development 
has focused on information management, business systems, and corporate information systems. But as 
interactive information systems became common in business, the US Armed Forces began to adapt and 
adopt DSS and Knowledge Management to facilitate military decision-making. D. J. Powers, A Brief 
History of Decision Support Systems. DSSResources.com, World Wide Web, 
http://dssresources.com/history/dsshistory.html, version 2.8, May 31, 2003, 1. 
16 This paper uses the definition of DSS from Hugh J. Watson, George Houdeshel, and Rex Kelly 
Rainer, Jr. Building Executive Information Systems and other Decision Support Applications (Hoboken, 
N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 1997), 263. 
17 For the planning process, the focus is on a “strategic model” of DSS that helps senior decision-
makers determine the objectives of the organization and the best way to use resources to achieve those 
objectives. Hugh J. Watson, George Houdeshel, and Rex Kelly Rainer, Jr. Building Executive Information 
Systems and other Decision Support Applications (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 1997), 275. 
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planning will not address long-range budgeting and organizational planning such as 
military force structure and procurement, nor will it address tactical planning in small 
units that focus on operating procedures to meet battlefield tasks. Both of these, while 
important, bracket the current deliberate operational planning challenge in Homeland 
Defense as both military organizational capabilities and tactical prowess appear to be 
sufficient to counter the threat if applied at the right time and place. The problem is to 
develop a plan to utilize these strengths in an effective manner against a thinking 
opponent who seeks surprise and shock. 
The effective military equivalent of this type of “strategic model” DSS is the 
traditional military act of “campaign planning.” For military planners, campaign planning 
is defined as the process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force 
commanders “translate national or theater strategic and operational concepts through the 
development of campaign plans” with the resulting campaign plan being a “plan for a 
series of related military operations aimed at achieving a strategic or operational 
objective within a given time and space.”18 This is the most rewarding focus for DSS 
analysis as “campaign planning” is a major challenge for Homeland Defense planners. It 
requires developing a synchronized and effective contingency course of action to counter 
an evolving and diverse threat environment.  
While there are many forms of effective campaign plans or contingency plans, 
each was the result of an efficient planning approach with many shared characteristics. 
Metrics of a good plan and effective planning methodology include a process that is 
flexible to evolving threats and emerging information on the threat. The process must be 
adaptable to different organizations, especially the lower level tactical and operational 
agencies that will execute the resulting plan. Measures of an effective plan also include 
being comprehensive to all operations and contingencies the plan is designed to address. 
The overall objective of contingency planning is to overcome operational uncertainty 
with flexibility in planning to produce living documents with options and branches that 
are fundamentally different from many contingency plans produced using traditional 
                                                 
18 Definitions from Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary 
of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001. (Washington, DC.: US Government Printing Office, 
2001), 59-60. 
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planning processes. Many of these plans appear to be detailed rigid plans that fill 
volumes on the shelf but offer as the only decision for senior leaders is to approve the 
execution, sit back, and watch. The measure of a good plan is the flexibility of options to 
produce plans that are the antithesis of the Schliffen Plan of 1905, where the government 
of Germany was presented only the option to invade both France and Belgium in 
response to Russian mobilization because their plan was based on rigid mobilization and 
movement timelines. 
Additionally, because the objective of any planning process is to facilitate senior 
level decision-making on resource allocation and risk assessments, both the process and 
the resulting plan must be understandable by senior decision-makers. This ensures both 
senior leader involvement and the ability to make sound choices. By leveraging senior 
leader involvement, a clearly comprehensible planning process should also clearly 
identify risks and recommendations on mitigation strategies to increase chances of 
success. The result of this planning process also must provide a linkage between the plan 
and required resources to identify decision points to decision-makers. The last 
requirement of an effective plan is a linkage between the plan and the organization’s 
exercise and training program to provide the mechanism to validate and modify the plan. 
 
B. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT PLANNING METHODOLOGIES 
The National Security Strategy identifies the vital function of having a formal and 
deliberate process of assessing threats, yet a viable and effective process to do this has yet 
to gain wide acceptance. When military planners use the words “threat assessment,” they 
are not just referring to any information or intelligence about potential opponents or 
enemies. They are also referring to the formal process of how this intelligence is analyzed 
and portrayed. Considering that the level, scope, and specificity of the intelligence to be 
assessed is often beyond the control of the planners, which approach or process is taken 
in the analysis phase is all the more critical in shaping the intelligence product sought: a 
“threat assessment.” Conceptually, there are three different fundamental approaches to 
conducting a threat assessment, with a focus on either the “who,” the “what,” or the 
“how” of the threat. In a traditional threat assessment, the process addresses the “who” of 
the threat – who is the threat actor, what is their “order of battle” and what are their most 
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likely courses of actions. The second conceptual approach to threat assessment is to look 
at the “what” of the threat – what part of the threat is a specific agency’s responsibility to 
defeat and what aspect of the threat must the planner address typically in a limited 
number of “threat scenarios.” 
However, both “threat-based” and “scenario-based” planning will not work 
effectively for Homeland Defense or Homeland Security planning because the 
asymmetric threat cannot be templated and is both uncertain and adaptive.19 Advocates of 
capabilities-based planning assert that it is this strong potential for the threat to achieve 
surprise by asymmetric means that makes threat-based and scenario-based planning a 
poor match for the needs of emerging planning challenges like Homeland Defense and 





memories of 9/11 and the fear
                                                
Threat-based planning is very susceptible to threat deception, causing the US 
to mischaracterize and often underestimate the threat 
 
Planners traditionally tend to “mirror image” threats when little hard 
intelligence is available which is only effective for symmetric threats 
 
Large bureaucracies like DOD tend toward group think and discourage “out of 
the box” thinking required to understand and assess asymmetric threats 
 
Resource constraints tend to focus time and money on traditional big ticket 
weapons systems and discourage development of capabilities for the 
“unproven” asymmetric threats 
As this list reveals, the reasons behind recent examples of the US being surprised 
by asymmetric enemies in a manner not addressed in existing contingency plans are all 
linked to the threat-based planning culture that laid deep roots during the Cold War. The 
s of unprecedented terrorist capabilities combine with these 
 
19 In expressing the variety of threats facing the US, the current National Strategy for Homeland 
Security (NSHLS) states, “Homeland security is focused on terrorism in the United States…Terrorists can 
be U.S. citizens or foreigners, acting in concert with others, on their own, or on behalf of a hostile state.” 
Statements like this define three main types of threats facing America today: a continuation of conventional 
military threats from hostile nation-states, traditional asymmetric threats from hostile states and state-
sponsored political groups, and a new trans-national terrorist threat from ideological enemies.  The US 
Homeland is confronted with a spectrum of threats ranging from traditional national security threats (for 
example, ballistic missile attack) to law enforcement threats (for example, drug smuggling) and countering 
these threats requires a series of formal threat assessments. National Strategy for Homeland Security 
(Government Printing Office, July 2002), 2. 
20 These four challenges for threat-based planning is detailed in the chapter “Responding to 
Asymmetric Threats” in New Challenges, New Tools for Defense Decisionmaking edited by Stuart Johnson, 
Martin Libicki, and Gregory F. Treverton (RAND Corporation Publication MR-1576-RC, 2003), 43-44. 
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uncertainties to drive Homeland Defense and Homeland Security planners to search for a 
planning process that avoids these pitfalls. 
1. Failure of a Threat-Based Planning Approach 
While utilizing the most modern information technologies, the current DOD 
planning process is based on traditional thinking and organizational habits adopted during 
the Cold War.21 Military contingency plans during the Cold War – a powerful historical 
foundation for the current generation of planners and senior leaders – were perceived by 
most as symmetric confrontations with a known enemy, which created cultural 
expectations of force-on-force combat and an acceptance of “mirroring” capabilities and 
intent in planning.22 This traditional military approach to planning is a threat-based 
approach that focused single contingency plans on a single enemy or combination of 
enemies – a conceptual “who” approach to the threat based on known hard data and 
assessment of leadership and decision-making. The goal of this process was a single 
course of action recommended to national strategic decision-makers that was portrayed as 
a series of moves and counter-moves proposed to thwart an enemy whose capabilities and 
intents had been forecasted in detail from decades of assessment.23 Even after the demise  
                                                 
21 Because of the formal and bureaucratic nature of current DOD planning, the complex Joint 
Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) process is codified in a series of published 
memorandums from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The first CJCS memorandum on 
JOPES, called Department of Defense CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System 
(JOPES), Volume 1 (Planning Policies and Procedures), lays out the policies and procedures for all of 
DOD to follow. This thick manual of approximately 400 pages is followed by three additional volumes of 
CJCS JOPES memorandums that provide details as to formats and procedures for planners. In addition to 
supporting instructions, labeled as CJCSI, this series of thick manuals is the intellectual foundation for 
modern military contingency planning. Department of Defense, CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning 
and Execution System (JOPES), Volume 1 (Planning Policies and Procedures), 14 July 2001. (Washington, 
DC.: US Government Printing Office, 2001), enclosure C, C-3. 
22 This practice resulted in plans having tables and tables of numbers and specifications of military 
hardware like ballistic missiles, tanks, planes, ships comparing US / Allies and Soviet / Warsaw Pact 
equivalents. Paul K. Davis, Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission Systems 
Analysis, and Transformation (RAND Corporation Publication MR 1513, 2002), 34-35. 
23 As a result of growing concerns with strategic “flashpoints” and the necessity of detailed planning 
to move the forces and logistics of the US military, producing and updating campaign plans became one of 
the key roles of military commanders. As a recent theorist on military information transformation proposed, 
“given the limits of Industrial Age communications, plans were the mechanisms by which military 
commanders sought to create the conditions necessary for success.” Because of this, “large, complex 
organizations in particular depended on comprehensive plans that required considerable time to prepare and 
also had to be continuously monitored, adjusted, and maintained.” David S. Alberts, and Richard E. Hayes. 
Power to the Edge: Command…Control… in the Information Age (Washington, DC.: Command and 
Control Research Program, CCRP Publications, 2003), 47. 
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of the focus on the expected clash in central Europe, this threat-based approach seemed 
effective in the post-Cold War world for nation-state opponents such as North Korea and 
Iraq.  
For senior military decision makers, the key point in the process is the concept 
development phase that is focused on mission analysis, threat assessment, and course of 
action development. Mission analysis is a formal tool for planners to determine the 
specific mission essential tasks that must be performed in order to successfully achieve 
the assigned objectives. When combined with the determined purpose for the plan, 
mission analysis produces the mission statement for the plan, the shaping of which is a 
key step for the military commander to express his vision for the contingency plan. Next, 
a formal Threat Assessment is produced from national intelligence estimates and 
information. For planners, an Intelligence Estimate is the “appraisal, expressed in writing 
or orally, of available intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view 
to determining the courses of action open to the enemy or potential enemy and the order 
of probability of their adoption.”24 The threat assessment is usually portrayed as “most 
likely course of action” and “most dangerous course of action.” This leads to an 
anticipated single line of action for the threat, most often depicted as a chronological 
series of actions. 
From these assessments of mission and opposition to that mission, planners then 
develop options for the commander which are most often in the form of proposed courses 
of action (COAs). For military planners, a COA is defined as “a possible plan open to an 
individual or commander that would accomplish, or is related to the accomplishment of 
the mission,” often expressed in terms of concept of operations (or execution concept), 
risk assessment, resources requirements, and resource shortfalls.25 While various staff 
elements (operations, logistics, legal, communications, etc.) determine supportability and 
feasibility of the proposed COAs in “Staff Estimates,” it is the development of the 
and the selection of the “Commander’s Concept” or options for the commander                                                  
24 Definition from Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary 
of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001. (Washington, DC.: US Government Printing Office, 
2001), 209. 
25 Definition from Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary 
of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001. (Washington, DC.: US Government Printing Office, 
2001), 130. 
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recommended COA that most shape the early output of traditional military planning. The 
decisive point in Concept Development is the presentation to the senior decision-maker 
of options on courses of action that accomplish the assigned mission and address likely 
and dangerous options available to the enemy. 
An outline of the DSS process for concept development can be expressed as a 
simplified version of the traditional military planning process showing required input and 
desired outputs (see Figure 1).26 The inputs that feed this system are strategic guidance 
that aims to spell out the goals and parameters for the forecasted contingency and 
intelligence products that the intelligence community provides in as much detail as 
possible on obstacles and enemies who oppose the achievement of those goals. The staff 
then produces a mission analysis and an intelligence estimate by assessing and 
synthesizing this information. Approving this foundation for concept development is the 
first of two major involvements by the military commander in his role as senior decision-
maker. The first set of decisions by the commander shapes the rest of planning by 
focusing efforts on specific mission essential tasks, often expressed in the commander’s 
chosen verbiage, and on expressing what the enemy is expected to do, could possibly do, 
and is capable of doing. By having the commander approve the threat estimate, planners 
are able to view and plan against the threat as the senior decision-maker sees it. The last 
input to concept development is the commander’s formal chance to issue “Initial 
Planning Guidance,” often expressed by the commander’s desired endstate, method for 
achieving success in the mission, and how the commander sees the operation or planned 
campaign supporting larger national strategic efforts.  
                                                 
26 The deliberate military planning process is a five phase system that starts the flow of planning from 
the first phase of plan initiation where strategic guidance and threat intelligence shapes the tasks assigned 
to the plan. From this guidance, planners develop a strategic concept during Phase II through a structured 
process of concept development and produce a proposed course of action to be reviewed and approved 
during the third phase. After a course of action has been approved by senior decision-makers in DOD, 
Phase III involved detailed planning required to develop and coordinate the forces, logistics, and 
transportation required to execute the plan. When this detailed plan development is complete, Phase IV 
involved review and approval of this detailed plan, leading to the last phase wherein all supporting and 
subordinate commands developed their own supporting plans for the approved course of action. As this 
reveals, what each phase does is tied to the evolution of the course of action proposed in Phase II and to the 
involvement of the senior decision-makers in shaping the final plan. Department of Defense, CJCSM 
3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume 1 (Planning Policies and 
Procedures), 14 July 2001. (Washington, DC.: US Government Printing Office, 2001), enclosure C, C-9. 
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With these foundational pieces in place, and in language shaped by the senior 
decision-maker himself, the planners are ready to develop varied options and courses of 
action for achieving the commander’s desired endstate. As the planners narrow planning 
on a handful of courses of action, the staff works to wargame the COAs to determine 
feasibility and desirability, resulting in the next intervention of the military commander. 
This takes place in the often-formal “Course of Action Decision Brief” whereby the 
commander selects his concept for how the operation will unfold. Once the commander 
selects a course of action and issues additional guidance for planning, the last step of 
Concept Development occurs as the staff fleshes out the concept with additional details. 
The result is an approved Strategic Concept, often described as the “base plan,” that is 
then expanded in plan development into a detailed document which can be hundreds of 
pages long for major regional warplans. As this description reveals, the current JOPES 
planning process can be expressed as “an interactive system…to support semi-structured 
and unstructured decision-making tasks” -  which makes this system a planning DSS.27 
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27 This paper uses the definition of DSS from Hugh J. Watson, George Houdeshel, and Rex Kelly 
Rainer, Jr. Building Executive Information Systems and other Decision Support Applications (Hoboken, 
N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 1997), 263. 
18 
The clearest example of the strength and dominance of this traditional DOD 
approach to the planning process was recent war planning for the invasion of Iraq. When 
seeking to understand what could happen and reactions to US moves, both military 
planners and analysts in the intelligence community relied on traditional threat 
information such as equipment in armored divisions, location of artillery units, ranges of 
missiles, historical profiles of key leaders, all forms of measurable data. From these 
knowns, analysts developed an Iraqi “order of battle” based on a traditional organization 
chart. When combined with knowledge of the Iraqi leadership’s formal decision-making 
process, this “who” approach also produced a relatively detailed menu of anticipated 
courses of action, based on the large volume of information known of the Iraqi 
government and Iraqi military. Planners then developed and refined the plan through a 
conceptual series of action-reaction cycles to predict what operations were required to 
achieve the desired end-state. For this nation-state opponent, planners believed the threat-
based assessment provided a solid foundation to plan the Coalition campaign. The result 
was a smashing success against the Iraqi leadership and especially against the 
conventional Iraqi military. While the planning for the Coalition campaign to depose 
Sadaam Hussain was in many ways innovative and unique, the process of plan 
development and senior leadership review that was used was very traditional and at times 
bureaucratic.  
This recent experience reinforced the idea that traditional campaign planning is 
best thought of as a DSS to reveal how the key phase for senior leader involvement is 
concept development because this is where commanders shape the campaign and make 
decisions on threats and options. One of the critical products for decision-makers in 
concept development is the “intelligence estimate” or “threat assessment.” As current 
DOD doctrine asserts, “intelligence should provide the commander with an 
understanding of the adversary in terms of the adversary’s probable intent, objectives, 
strengths, weaknesses, probable COAs, most dangerous COA, values, and critical 
vulnerabilities.”28 Based on this threat assessment and strategic guidance, planners will 
develop a single course of action with branches and sequels. This traditional planning 
                                                 
28 The importance of this military function is the common theme of current military doctrine on 
intelligence. See Department of Defense, Joint Publication 2-0: Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint 
Operations, 09 March 2000. (Washington, DC.: US Government Printing Office, 2000), I-4. 
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process results in decision-makers selecting a single contingency plan with a “throw the 
switch” type decision being the result. Therefore, traditional military planning process is 
a DSS with a single decision chain. This was possible during the relatively stable 
strategic environment of the Cold War when even complex plans for major theater wars 
could go years with only slight modifications.29 
Planner acceptance and understanding of an innovative approach to planning like 
capabilities-based is made all the more difficult by the pervasiveness of the threat-based 
process cemented during the Cold War. However, this threat-based planning approach 
requires a level of detailed intelligence that is just not available for today’s trans-national 
terrorist threat. Post-war planning in Iraq revealed the bottom limit for intelligence hard 
data required for the traditional planning process. Even knowing the shortfalls of this 
traditional approach, most emerging threats to the Coalition forces were originally 
expressed as supporting conventional military forces. During the drive on Baghdad, 
intelligence analysts (and TV pundits) searched asymmetric and terrorist groups like the 
“Saddam Fadayeen” and “Mohammed’s Army” for formal plans, organizational 
structures, and chains of command as if they were made up of conventional hierarchical 
units. Only after the first chaotic months of Coalition occupation was this approach 
modified, reflecting a recognition that insufficient information was available on an 
asymmetric enemy whose non-hierarchical cell structure offered few targets for 
conventional military operations. Anticipating problems like this, one planning analyst 
concluded, “planning that is threat based requires an established threat. When adversaries 
hide the details of their threats, it can take years or even decades (if ever) to uncover,” 
placing the US at a disadvantage and almost ensuring surprise will be achieved by 
asymmetric threats.30  
                                                 
29 “Thus, even though hierarchies are relatively slow [to adapt], they could keep pace with a fairly 
stable security environment, which characterized most of the 20th Century.” David S. Alberts, and Richard 
E. Hayes. Power to the Edge: Command…Control… in the Information Age (Washington, DC.: Command 
and Control Research Program, CCRP Publications, 2003), 225. 
30 Paul K. Davis, Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission Systems Analysis, 
and Transformation (RAND Corporation Publication MR 1513, 2002), 46. 
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Figure 2.   Traditional Approach to Threat Assessment. 
 
Even after the demise of the focus on the expected clash in central Europe, this 
threat-based approach seemed effective in the post-Cold War world for nation-state 
opponents such as North Korea and Iraq (see Figure 2). However conceptually simple 
this traditional “who” approach is for a threat like the North Korean military, when 
looking at the complex combination of state, state-sponsored, and non-state threat actors 
that the US Homeland faces, this threat-based planning process produces only guesses 
and vague pictures of potential threat actions. This is because of the lack of hard 
intelligence of al Quida’s organizational structure, operational capabilities, and strategic 
plan of action required to develop a viable action-reaction conceptual framework. 
Without knowing how many “cells” are operating, how they receive operational 
guidance, and where specifically they plan to strike, planners have little certainty to base 
plans on. While intelligence successes in the global war or terrorism have been filling in 
the blanks on many questions, the absence of a template and historical data will continue 
to frustrate those who seek to apply a traditional “who” approach for the unprecedented 
threats to the US Homeland. This requirement for factual data and historical templates 
drives the current search for “actionable intelligence” that will fill in the blanks and 
reveal projected threat actions and anticipated reactions to potential defensive operations.  
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Figure 3.   Failure of Traditional Threat Assessment. 
 
Because of the inherent secrecy and covert structure of groups like al Quida, this 
“actionable intelligence” is in short supply and is unable, even for those who have access 
to classified detainee debriefs and communications intercepts, to provide a confident 
assessment of planned and on-going operations. This is not a challenge that will likely be 
overcome in the future as trans-national terrorist groups are making secrecy and 
protection of this information a priority through encoding messages, building non-
hierarchical cell structures, an ideological and not hierarchical decision-making process, 
and amorphous relationships between various terrorists groups and supporters. The result 
will most likely be a continuation of the intelligence situation where very few specifics 
are known. For all these reasons, taking a traditional threat-based planning approach in an 
asymmetric and unprecedented threat environment can be inherently frustrating because 
of the absence of enough hard intelligence and results in continued inability to template a 
terrorist “order of battle” and determine any form of predicted threat likely courses of 
action (see Figure 3). 
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While functional for traditional war planning, the very nature of the current 
diverse and amorphous threat to the US Homeland prevents any traditional military 
planning process from producing effective security and defense plans. Unlike regional 
planning against hostile nation-states, the challenge of assessing the asymmetric 
Homeland Defense threats prevents the development of “most likely” and “most 
dangerous” courses of action. Additionally, only the broadest guidance to thwart the 
enemy’s plans of attack is given due to the absence of detailed analysis of opponents’ 
decision-making systems and a clear understanding of threat operational and strategic 
goals. For these reasons, the traditional planning DSS appears poorly structured to meet 
the challenges of Homeland Defense contingency planning because of the diverse and 
amorphous threat and the need for multiple options for execution that prevent any ability 
to forecast potential moves and counter-moves (Figure 4). 
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Because of the nature of the inputs into any HLD contingency planning, the 
mission analysis and intelligence estimate steps cannot accurately template how threat 
actions will likely unfold, which is a requirement in order to produce a course of action 
that would counter anticipated contingencies. In other words, the problem with the 
traditional approach is the inability to produce a single course of action option to the 
commander that can accomplish the broad and diverse Homeland Defense missions while 
countering the diverse threat capabilities available to various hostile actors. With multiple 
inputs, traditional planning conceptually breaks down because of its inability to present 
viable COAs for the commander to assess and select. Because of these diverse inputs in 
guidance and threat assessment, the traditional planning process is simply unable to be 
restructured to deliver multiple outputs – not a single COA, but a “menu” of options to 
counter the menu of options available to asymmetric threat actors. Therefore, the inherent 
challenges in Homeland Defense planning include the inability to template the threat and 
the inability to develop a single course of action that promises to counter the threat. 
Effective Homeland Defense (and Homeland Security) planning process must overcome 
these two problems.  
2. Failure of a Scenario-Based Planning Approach 
After 9/11, many HLS planners tried a different approach to contingency planning 
by using a “scenario-based” planning process that focused on what events could happen. 
This approach was based on “what if” drills that postulated a limited number of threat 
actions and then wargamed agency responsibilities for potential counters. The process of 
this scenario-based approach was best seen at the Salt Lake City Olympics where 
planners from various agencies with counter-terrorism and consequence management 
responsibilities did “what if” drills and coordinated their planned responses. This use 
shows the advantages of this method of planning as it is very simple in execution and can 
be modified based on what scenarios are selected. These “what if” contingency plans also 
have the benefit of not requiring a detailed threat assessment as issues and questions 
concerning the threat can be mitigated by making assumptions to fit the scenario. Though 
conceptually simple, and therefore attractive for initial planning efforts, this approach 
does have weaknesses because effective “scenario-based” planning requires certainty 
about possible scenarios and a limited number of scenarios to plan against.  
An inherent problem with this “what if” method is unavoidable – scenario-based 
planning only produces plans for the contingency scenarios selected. For example, all of 
these challenges were revealed in 2002 when DOD facilitated a Homeland Security and 
Homeland Defense series of tabletop exercises to wargame existing contingency plans in 
what became labeled as the “Nine Scenarios.” The goal of this planning exercise was to 
clarify DOD responsibilities during the stand-up of the Department of Homeland 
Security. However, during the initial meetings, there was little agreement as to what 
scenarios to utilize because of lack of consensus on the most likely “what ifs” – a return 
to the need for “actionable intelligence” to discern what, how, and where the terrorists 
were going to strike next. As a result, nine very broad scenarios such as “attack on a port” 
and “biological attack” were selected, multiple branches and variations of each scenario 
were developed. The process was reduced to a discussion of what would be the most 
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challenging scenarios (a lengthy list of extreme contingencies) and a conscious dismissal 
of any attempt to determine a limited and manageable number of likely “what if” 
contingencies. The end result was disagreement on reasonable scenarios and little 
progress on wargaming and planning due to an inability to get past discussions on the 
scenarios themselves – what DOD planners are told to avoid, “fighting the scenario.”  
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recently attempted to overcome 
this challenge by formalizing a set of standard threat scenarios in order to establish an 
accepted baseline for planning and funding response incidents and crises. This form of 
“universal threat” planning is designed to be the foundation for the development of all 
HLS “national preparedness standards from which homeland security capabilities can be 
measured.”31 Because of the current counter-terrorism focus and concern for potential 
mass casualty attacks, DHS introduced a formal threat baseline of “threat scenarios” that 
city planners are to use to evaluate their current level of manning, equipping, and 
planning for prevention and recovery capacity. While utilizing a scenario-based planning 
process, even the introduction to these “planning scenarios” stresses the need for 
capabilities-based planning and emphasizes that “for domestic incident preparedness to 
proceed through a capabilities-based approach.”32 
However, this effort has also run into resistance from HLS planners because of 
claims that “one size does not fit all.” This scenario-based approach makes claims of 
flexibility with “ways that allow them to be adapted to local conditions,” but offers a 
framework of set tasks and agency roles that cannot be easily modified.33 City planners 
and decision-makers are quick to point out that each city is in fact unique with some 
having mass transit, some having port facilities, and all having different venues for large 
gatherings and different levels of threat from overseas terrorists. This standardized 
approach also intrinsically offers no flexibility to modify the scenarios for local or 
changing conditions. The challenge for any scenario-based approach is being able to plan 
                                                 
31 Homeland Security Council, Planning Scenarios: Created for Use in National, Federal, State, and 
Local Homeland Security Preparedness Activities, July 2004 (Washington, DC., 2004), iii. 
32 Homeland Security Council, Planning Scenarios: Created for Use in National, Federal, State, and 
Local Homeland Security Preparedness Activities, July 2004 (Washington, DC., 2004), vi. 
33 Homeland Security Council, Planning Scenarios: Created for Use in National, Federal, State, and 
Local Homeland Security Preparedness Activities, July 2004 (Washington, DC., 2004), iii. 
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with certainty that the scenarios developed will be “the” scenarios that will be faced. That 
certainty is a rare and perishable commodity in the diverse planning community that 
addresses the multifaceted and ambiguous threats to the US Homeland. 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld expressed a simple idea when he pointed 
out, “Our [DOD] job is to close off as many of those avenues of attack as possible. We 
must prepare for new forms of terrorism, to be sure, but also for attacks on U.S. space 
assets, cyber-attacks on our information networks, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and 
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.”34 This requires a different approach from 
developing a “Universal Task List” of a limited number of generic scenarios that all 
agencies and locals are to plan for. “Closing off” the ability of threat actors to use 
methods of attack – i.e., their “capabilities” – is the goal of capabilities-based planning. 
The process of capabilities-based planning outlined in this paper is a flexible approach 
that can be both adapted and adopted. A scenario-based planning process inherently 
limits the flexibility of the planners. In focusing on what a threat can do rather than threat 
scenarios, the flexibility inherent in capabilities-based planning: allows any organization 
at any level to build a menu of their own capabilities or develop a menu within a menu of 
what is required to support the larger counter-terrorism efforts. In contrast to the 
inflexible nature of a “Universal Task List,” capabilities-based planning enables rapid 
revision of plans to address changing strategy, threats, capabilities, or political / military 
dynamics and provides up-to-date options for senior decision-makers of any organization.  
Because the first step of any effective contingency planning process is to assess 
the diverse and complex threats to the Homeland in a manageable and coherent process, 
these “who” and “what” approaches to Homeland Security and Homeland Defense threat 
assessment both have difficulty producing the answers required by planners. However, a 
“how” approach to the threat is more promising because of its applicability to a more 
nebulous and unstructured threat environment. For this approach, the question “what is 
the threat” is addressed as a reworded question “what could the threat DO.” Utilizing all  
                                                 
34 Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military,” Foreign Affairs Volume 81, Number 3 
(May/June 2002). 
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the information available, regardless of specificity, analysts using this process seek to 
define and assess what threat capabilities any potential hostile nation-state or non-state 
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III. A CAPABILITIES-BASED APPROACH TO CONTINGENCY 
PLANNING 
Because of diverse inputs in guidance and threat assessment, the traditional 
planning process is simply unable to be restructured to deliver multiple outputs – not a 
single course of action for prevention of attacks, but a “menu” of options to counter the 
menu of options available to asymmetric threat actors. This push for more options forms 
the basis for the push for a capabilities-based planning process that can meet the 
requirement of delivering a “menu” plan for complex and amorphous contingencies in 
Homeland Defense campaign plans at US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). After 
the challenges of HLD planning since 9/11, the combatant commander of 
USNORTHCOM tasked his HLD planners to develop a plan that could link required 
resources with anticipated risks. Without a clear enemy order of battle, the commander 
believed any effective preventative plan must identify the specific resource cost and 
answer the question, “what do these resources buy?” Additionally, any HLD planning 
process must consider risk and address the question, “where and how much is an 
acceptable level of risk for this Plan?” Because of these factors, a traditional approach to 
planning that is threat-based appeared ill prepared for such an amorphous and dynamic 
planning environment where so little is known about the enemy’s plans and arsenal while 
the threats’ intentions to do harm are crystal clear.  
This chapter will show that by using a capabilities-based approach to threat 
assessment, the question “who is the threat” is reworded as “what could the threat DO” to 
allow exploration of a much broader range of eventualities and give HLD or HLS 
planners a defined and detailed threat to plan against. When military planners use the 
words “threat assessment,” they are not just referring to the information or intelligence 
about potential opponents or enemies, but also about the formal process of how this 
intelligence is analyzed and portrayed. Considering that the level, scope, and specificity 
of the intelligence to be assessed is often beyond the control of the planners, which 
approach or process is taken in the analysis phase is all the more critical in shaping the 
intelligence products sought: a “threat assessment.” Though each of these conceptual 
approaches to threat assessment is valid for some types of planning, this chapter will 
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demonstrate that a “capabilities-based” approach to threat assessment has the advantage 
of being applicable to amorphous threats, flexible for evolving threats, and adaptable for 
diverse threats. 
This chapter will then focus on demonstrating a method to conduct capabilities-
based planning that will overcome the planning challenges identified in the last chapter. 
The capabilities-based planning process will identify forces, tasks, and enablers to 
counter any likely potential threat capability. While conceptually straightforward, this 
approach to planning against threat capabilities requires the same level of work and 
wargaming in order to develop effective contingency plans, but what is different is the 
ability to simply both understand and express what is being done about specific threat 
scenarios and calculate, explain what resources are required, and identify specific 
resources devoted toward countering each threat capability. 
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Figure 5.   Capabilities-Based Planning Decision Support System. 
 
This push for more options forms the basis for the push for a capabilities-based 
planning process that can meet the requirement of delivering a “menu” plan for complex 
and amorphous contingencies in Homeland Defense campaign plans. The requirement is 
for a flexible process that resembles a conceptual “menu” approach to planning. A 
capabilities-based planning process can therefore be defined as an analytical process of 
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assessing means, capacity, and likelihood of all potentially hostile actors to strike with an 
emphasis on recasting intelligence uncertainty into a modular “menu” of potential threat 
capabilities. Therefore, capabilities-based planning provides senior military decision-
makers with a DSS that has the inherent flexibility to address Homeland Defense 
contingency planning (Figure 5). This required planning process would result in a 
solution framework emphasizing “building blocks” of capabilities that could be tailored 
to meet persistent general threats or a specific emerging threat.35 
This menu approach of capabilities-based planning provides more flexibility for 
Homeland Defense planning. The challenge for Homeland Defense decision-makers is 
the need to adopt a DSS that can adapt to a changing and dangerous environment. This is 
not just an issue of new communications and computer technologies, but must emphasize 
and facilitate the critical role of strategic and operational decision-making. While 
discussing the growing complexity in organizational decision-making, a recent 
Management Information article on DSS supports this conclusion by asserting, 
“organizations and their decision support systems must embrace procedures that can deal 
with this complexity and go beyond the technical orientation of previous DSS.”36 Often, 
the decisive point of whether a key decision will be made in an effective and timely 
manner is not on the computer screen, but between the ears of the decision-maker. “To 
assure these advanced information technologies provide maximum benefit to the user, the 
Army needs to incorporate …adaptive decision-aiding capabilities,” concludes one 
military researcher, “these technologies will achieve their optimal effectiveness only if 
they are compatible with the cognitive capabilities and limitations of the commanders, 
staff and soldiers who will use them.”37 This challenge starts at the selection of a process 
to assess the threat. 
 
                                                 
35 This “building block” approach is addressed as a key element in capabilities-based planning in Paul 
K. Davis, Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission Systems Analysis, and 
Transformation (RAND Corporation Publication MR 1513, 2002), 4. 
36 James F. Courtney, Decision Making and Knowledge Management in Inquiring Organizations: 
Toward a new Decision-Making Paradigm for DSS. ScienceDirect: Decision Support Systems, World 
Wide Web, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science.html. Decision Support Systems, Volume 31, Issue 1, 
May 2001, 17. 
37 Thomas H. Killion, “Decision Making and the Levels of War,” in Military Review, US Army 
Command and General Staff College, November – December 2000, 70 
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A. DEVELOPING A CAPABILITIES-BASED THREAT ASSESSMENT 
A new conceptual approach needs to be found to structure and assess threats in 
Homeland Defense contingency planning. A solution to this challenge can be found in the 
concepts of “lines of operation” and “capabilities” as dynamics to define and explain 
potential and likely threat-friendly interaction. As oppose the spatial or temporal 
divisions of the battlespace by borders, domains like air and seas, and phasing like build-
up, defense, and offense, Homeland Defense campaigns are shaped by a reactive concept 
to threat actions and the division of the threat into potential lines of operation. “Lines of 
operation” are defined by the Department of Defense as “lines that define the directional 
orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy.”38 For Homeland 
Defense and Homeland Security operations, these lines of operation can be modified to 
address distinct and related methods of both attack and defense such as “maritime 
attacks” or “attacks on continuity of government.” 
These lines of operation for the threat can then be defined and depicted in terms 
of specific capabilities. The Department of Defense dictionary defines a “capability” as 
“the ability to execute a specific course of action (a capability may or may not be 
accompanied by an intention).”39 Having a capability implies the ability to perform a set 
of tasks required to accomplish the mission requiring the capability. This intentionally 
very broad definition covers both capabilities involved in strategic organizational issues 
like force sizing and procurement and operational issues like tactics and weapon 
performance. For this paper, a capability is defined as the ability to perform the task set 
out in the capability within the conditions and performance standards accepted for that 
mission set. Therefore, the capability to conduct a “swarm boat attack” includes the 
ability to plan and execute multiple simultaneous attacks on maritime targets using small 
boats with an expectation of causing significant damage to the targets. However, it is 
important to highlight that this does not imply that the group with this capability has the 
plan or the intent to use this specific capability in their next attack.  
                                                 
38 U.S. Department of Defense. Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (Washington, DC.: US Government Printing Office, 2001), 246. 
39 U.S. Department of Defense. Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (Washington, DC.: US Government Printing Office, 2001), 60. 
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Figure 6.   A Capabilities-Based Approach to Threat Assessment. 
 
In addressing the question “what is the threat,” this “how” approach aims to 
produce a matrix of possible (and likely) threat capabilities that need to be countered by 
assessing the threat by capability and not by group or actor (see Figure 6). For example, 
with a potential of multiple actors possessing the means and the will to conduct terrorism 
in the US Homeland, the focus of assessment is not al Quida, but any potential terrorist 
group; what terrorist acts (or capabilities) are possible? Now the question becomes 
manageable within current information limits because the intelligence analysts are no 
longer predicting what or where al Quida will strike next, but how could any terrorist 
could strike. In this manner, a capabilities-based threat assessment is done by first 
assessing what types of threat lines of operation are possible to bring threat capabilities 
against the US (i.e., – Ballistic missiles? Terrorism? Air attack?). Then for each type of 
threat faced, threat lines of operation or “red lines” of threat capabilities can be developed 
to identify specific methods to deliver threat capabilities. Even this rudimentary level of 
analysis can assist planners in providing a framework for the threat environment. The 
combination of “lines of operations” and “capabilities” inherent in capabilities-based 
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Figure 7.   Developing Threat Lines of Operation and Threat Capabilities. 
 
The same assessment can then be done for each threat type to identify possible 
hostile capabilities. In building these threat lines of operation or “red lines,” intelligence 
can be used, not to dictate what exactly trans-national terrorist groups and rogue states 
are most likely to do, but rather to determine the range of possibilities – the maximum 
and minimum threat each group posses to the US Homeland (see Figure 7). For example, 
the threat of ballistic missiles is both complex (due to the technical nature of the method) 
and well-understood (due to the limited number of threat actors and the physics 
involved). However, what exactly is the threat? If the threat of strategic attack is 
developed as a threat capability type, a relatively simple example of a threat line of 
operation emerges. Even though missile defense rests on hard data of numbers and 
ranges, developing a maximum and minimum limit to this threat “red line” helps frame 
the answer to the threat question and helps missile defense planners by scoping the 
challenge (and defining the required HLD capability). For example, the minimum threat 
to the US Homeland is not zero – the potential for accidental launch or North Korean 
strategic miscalculation ensures that; and the maximum is not the combined strategic 
arsenals of Russia, China, France, Great Britain, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. 
In this manner, following through this intellectual process of analysis also helps both 
analysts and planners by graphically representing an intellectual framework for the threat 
environment. 
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While intelligence information may reveal glimpses of the ideology and goals of 
various threat actors, the simple formula of “threat ideology plus capabilities equals 
likely targets and courses of action” cannot be used a tool for threat assessment because 
ideology is rarely easy to assess and often can lead to simple – and incorrect – predictions 
of threat actions. Problems with an ideological approach can surface on two levels during 
the threat assessment. First, a single group’s ideology, often the group judged to be the 
most dangerous, can be superimposed on all threats, artificially narrowing potential threat 
courses of action and possibly overlooking equally likely capabilities. For example, the 
perceived aim of al Quida is often offered as the goals of “fundamental Islamists,” but the 
numerous diverse groups under this label have disparate and often contradictory 
ideological objectives. Additionally, there is the complex and difficult problem of 
accurately determining a threat groups ideology from the outside, based on partial and 
limited information. For these reasons, the key for a viable assessment framework is to 
broadly focus across potential threats and not focus on the perceived ideology of a single 
threat actor. The proposed capabilities-based approach allows for this by integrating 
known threat information on ideology and likely activities by limiting the spectrum of 
templeted capabilities within a framework of a maximum and minimum threat framework 
addressed on each “red line.” 
The terrorist threat to US ports and maritime commerce can be developed as an 
example of a “capabilities-based” threat line of operation. The first step is an assessment 
of all potential threat actors and methods of attack within the parameters of a “red line” 
based on the method of threat operation and their target rather then simply the borders of 
the domain (i.e., – a cruise missile attack on a port can be considered a “maritime attack” 
even though it is an air-breathing flying weapon). By looking at all potential threat 
capabilities, analysts evaluate threats from both state and non-state actors and consider 
any likely method of attack and sort each capability by magnitude of impact.  
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By building a spectrum of specific and distinct threat capabilities along a single 
line of operation, analysis of current intelligence on each threat actor can help define 
what constitutes “likely” threats that are feasible and anticipated means of attack and can 
shape the minimum and maximum of the threat along the developing threat “red line” 
(see Figure 6). Intelligence can also guide the designation of a “most likely” attack 
method for each group and a collective “most likely” capability (seen in the red diamond 
on the threat “red line”) for the entire threat line of operation. The result is a coherent and 
comprehensive threat assessment for a threat such as the notional “transnational air 


















































Figure 8.   Developing an Assessment of Threat Capabilities. 
 
Bracketing potential hostile capacities with assumptions of likelihood facilitates 
narrowing planning into manageable (and often affordable and acceptable) realms. 
Between these two assumed limits are then templated other possible threat capabilities 
associated with this threat type regardless of which threat actor processes this capability 
or method of attack. In this manner, amorphous threats can be defined and codified to 
enable planners to develop a list of required capabilities and required authorities and 
policies to counter anticipated enemy actions while being inherently flexible to changes 
in the strategic threat environment. In essence, this enables an amorphous threat to be 
assessed as a menu of distinct (and conceptually simple) attack “capability” types with 
assigned degrees of likelihood and magnitude. Each new piece of intelligence then 
further refines what threat capabilities need to be depicted and any “actionable 
intelligence” would trigger the execution of pre-planned defense and security lines of 
operation already identified and enabled. 
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This “how” process also has the advantage of being conceptually simple, though 
complex and detailed in practice and open to constant conceptual refinement. An 
example of a simplified (and notional) capabilities-based threat assessment can be seen in 
the transnational air attack threat line of operation in Figure 8. This line of operation for 
the threat would be built to include all unconventional asymmetric air threats aimed at the 
US Homeland, but tailored for the responsibility and role of the organization conducting 
the assessment. In this way, while each numbered capability point is subject to challenge 
and dissection, the holistic nature of the threat and what needs to be countered are 
graphically represented. Then current intelligence on various threat actors would 
determine the most likely threat threshold as seen by the red diamond depicted at 
capability G7. For the “transnational air attack” line of operation (if conducted with 
actual intelligence available), the product from this process would answer questions on 































“Transnational air attack” includes all air threats originating inside the  
US (includes terrorism and asymmetric attacks)  
Most Likely 
Threat     Capability Parameters:   
• G1   Single UAV / Remote Control Aircraft (A/C)  kinetic attack with intel warning  
• G2 Single small General Aviation Aircraft (GAA) kinetic attack with intel warning  
• G3  Single cruise missile attack, with High-Explosive (HE) with intel warning  
• G4  Single hijack GAA / cargo A/C kinetic attack with intel warning  
• G5  Large hijack A/C Kinetic attack, outside National Capital Region (NCR), limited warning  
• G6  Multiple hijack GAA / cargo A/C kinetic attack with intel warning   
• G7  Large hijack A/C Kinetic attack, in NCR, limited warning  
• G8  Lim ited cruise missile attack, with Chem / Bio with limited warning   
• G9 Large A/C Kinetic attack, with Chem / RDD in NCR, limited warning   



















This capabilities-based approach to threat assessment can also work for HLS-type 
threats where agency responsibilities overlap. An example of a simplified (and notional) 
capabilities-based HLS threat assessment can be seen in the transnational threat line of 
operation involving land attacks as depicted in Figure 9. In this example, eight threat 
capabilities are determined to be the potential “how” the enemy might attack and the 
three lowest magnitude capabilities (H1, H2, H3) are determined to be the most likely. 
This threshold “red diamond” of assessed probability can be adjusted by intelligence 
“chatter” or perceived changes in vulnerabilities (for example, during a special event). 
While focusing planners on the most likely threat, this capabilities-based assessment also 
depicts other, less-likely threats (H4 – H8) that must be addressed in contingency 
planning due to their greater magnitude and potential impact. While greatly 
oversimplified, these example “red lines” show enough assessment of the threat that 
planners can identify and develop defensive lines of operation and capabilities needed to 




























“Transnational land attack” includes unconventional / asymmetric  
 threats to s ites / facilities (includes CBRNE and terrorism)
Most Likely
 
Threat     Capability Parameters:
• H1  Sabotage to facility with intel warning
• H2 Shooting at single facility with intel warning
• H3  Single vehicle bomb at facility, with intel warning
• H4  Coordinated suicide bombers, non-NCR, with intel warning
• H5 Single MANPAD attack on aircraft, with intel warning
• H6   Coordinated Chem / RDD attack, with intel warning
• H7 Single Chem / RDD attack, limited warning
• H8 Coordinated Chem / RDD attack, limited warning
Threat 








Figure 10.   Example of Capabilities-Based Threat Assessments (Illustrative 
Purpose Only). 
 
While this “how” assessment is a distinct process from traditional approaches to 
threat assessment, this focus on threat capabilities integrates the strengths of threat-based 
(“who”) and responsibilities-based (“what”) approaches. From threat-based, all available 
hard data on the threat can be integrated into an assessment of likely capabilities, 
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maximum and minimum threats. This threat-based data is also required to define what 
each capability entails and its capacities and limitations (for example, defining what 
constitutes a “Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device” or “VBIED” and what are 
possible delivery means). Additionally, assessments of current intelligence indicators and 
hostile leadership communications can focus efforts on certain threat lines and certain 
threat capabilities. As a result, the knowledge of the threat from a “threat-based” 
approach can be integrated into the proposed approach in the development of likelihood 
of the use of threat capacities and in determining the limits of these threat capabilities. 
At the same time, each threat capability addressed on a threat line of operation 
(“red line”) can be seen as an individual scenario that can be wargamed within a larger 
framework. Integrating the value of this type of “what” approach, each threat capability 
(i.e., capability point on a threat “red line”) can be exercised as a possible scenario for 
planners and senior leaders to wargame agency responsibilities and required authorities. 
Also, certain “red lines” and threat capabilities could be identified as being a different 
agency’s responsibility, but these assumptions have now been formalized and a 
mechanism identified to validate these divisions of responsibility. In this way, 
capabilities-based threat assessment is a viable and synergistic process of answering the 
simple and fundamental question “what is the threat” by focusing on “how” a threat could 
attack the US Homeland. Furthermore, this process is scalable and the resulting 
assessments could be as complex, or as simple, as the planning needs dictate. 
 
B. DEVELOPING A CAPABILITIES-BASED MENU OF OPTIONS 
The key to the capabilities-based plan is a direct linkage between threat 
capabilities and required friendly capabilities to counter them. As the threat has been 
assessed into a set number of capabilities and defined with a minimum and maximum 
potential threat, the friendly line of operation required to counter the threat can be 
bounded into a similar set of capabilities bounded by the same minimum and maximum 
as depicted in Figure 10. Then, each threat capability is examined to determine what can 
be done to negate this capability and prevent its successful execution by treating each as a 
distinct and individual threat scenario. For each specific threat capability to be 
successfully executed, certain threat actions must be done in sequence concerning 
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planning, preparation, transit, and execution, all which can be wargamed even with a 
limited amount of detailed and unambiguous knowledge about specific threat actors and 
tactics. From this discrete and defined scenario of potential threat actions, an individual 
“blue” capability plan can be formed by then basically asking what can be done to stop 
this action. The parameters of each capability data point can be expressed as planned 















































Figure 11.   Capabilities-Based Planning Concept. 
 
While intelligence assessment of threat capabilities set the red diamond (likely 
threat), the experience and judgment of senior decision-makers establish the appropriate 
blue diamond or “planning threshold.” This is not simply a matter of matching the 
anticipated likelihood of threat attacks because reasoning on vulnerabilities and intent of 
the organizational leadership may decide to either over-match the threat by placing the 
blue diamond at a higher magnitude than the red or by accepting a greater risk by 
lowering the level of resource commitment. Additionally, setting the planning threshold 
at a certain point does not necessarily negate or ignore all threat capabilities along the 
higher end of the threat lines of operation because planners can still establish contingency 
plans for the emergence of a set or all of these less-likely, but higher magnitude threat 
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capabilities. In this way, the planning threshold or “blue diamond” just differentiates 
between “Be Prepared To” type tasks with dedicated resources and unresourced 








































The development of individual lines of operations and specific capabilities can 
also be a method to integrate diverse capabilities and coordinated multiple organizations 
into a joint response. Because various capability experts are simply being asked “what 
can they DO to counter a specific threat capability,” detection, preventative, and 
defensive activities can all be integrated into a single capability package and expressed as 
a single capability data point along the appropriate friendly line of operation (i.e., 
collected at a single point along a “blue line”). This matrixed planning can be as detailed 
as required and each capability point can be “drilled down” in order to establish a 
coordinated and synchronized preventative package. However, the strength of this 
approach also is that each capability point can be simplified and expressed to senior 
leadership for the difficult decisions on resources and risk.    
Additionally, the same straightforward question can be asked of different agencies 
and organizations in order to build a coordinated (and commonly understood) response to 
counter a specific threat capability. Planners from subordinate or outside organizations 
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can develop independent preventative lines of operation with unique and redundant 
capabilities assigned to counter the assessed threat capabilities (red lines with data 
points). Following any guidance on assignment of tasks and overall mission(s), 
leadership intent, and end state objectives, planners can then produce their own 
organization’s assessment of required capabilities (blue lines with data points) and 
resources required at each blue data point. After each agency has developed potential 
counter capabilities, these capabilities can be integrated (and redundancies removed) by 
simply combining the lines of operation and incorporating the designated capabilities at 
each planned capability. 
An example of this approach could be seen in how a “blue line” could be 
developed against the notional “transnational maritime threat” line of operation. Because 
each of the labeled capability data points along the threat line of operation is a specific 
maritime threat scenario, HLD and HLS planners can address each in turn to determine 
what their own organization could do to counter that individual asymmetric maritime 
threat aimed at the US Homeland. For example, to counter the most-likely threat 
capability, planners would assess all possible preventative actions within their assigned 
responsibilities and geographic area that could be used to defeat an attack of a single 
boat-bomb with limited warning due to the ship with the bomb not being previously 
identified as a “vessel of interest.” The resulting matrix of specific actions would include 
detection measures such as harbor patrol, prevention measures such as waterside 
obstacles and buoys, and defensive measures such as armed guards on board selected 
vessels and a more heavily armed quick response force. The resources required for this 
capability would then become known, as would warning time required to generate non-
standing capabilities and the requirement for standing detection mechanisms to provide 
that warning time. While this example is grossly oversimplified, planners could use this 
approach to whatever level of detail required and then wargame each red capability 
against the proposed response to determine any shortfalls.  
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This example also demonstrates the inherent flexibility and adaptability of this 
approach to planning because the discover or suspicion of a new threat capability or the 
emergence of a new threat group with an innovative line of operation against the US 
Homeland would dictate the addition of blue points or possibly even entire new blue lines 
of operation. But this could be done during wargaming or even during crisis action 
planning without disrupting the larger concept of operation and planning approach. 
Decision-makers could also remove red lines and threat capabilities as threats are 
degraded or responsibilities shift between organizations. Resetting the “planning 
threshold” for each defensive line of operation can also be adjusted based on the latest 
threat intelligence queuing and decision-makers’ judgment of the environment. This 
inherent flexibility and cyclic nature of capabilities-based planning helps integrate 
contingency planning and current operations by removing the distinction between how 
the two are expressed and assessed. 
Because each friendly capability is matrixed individually, the process of 
determining resource requirements is both relatively simple and dynamic in a changing 
environment. The resources needed for each individual capability along each line of 
operation can be added and, after removing possible resource duplication, the total cost in 
personnel, equipment, and funding can be easily calculated. Because each capability data 
point can be considered as its own scenario and can be made as detailed as required with 
specific parameters and shaping assumptions, the resource requirements for each can be 
determined by asking the simple question, “what types and what amounts of resources 
does your organization need to counter this specific threat?” For senior decision-makers 
and operators alike, this establishes a key linkage between resources and assessed threats 
in straightforward manner. 
Additionally, this process will reveal required “enablers” such as staff support 
tasks, standing or pre-designated command and control relationships, pre-approved 
authorities for using force, concept of employment for any alert forces, and coordinated 
surveillance tasks required for the planned capabilities (blue lines) to be executed. This 
can be done through internally wargaming the prevention plan at each capability point to 
determine what non-resource requirements -in communications, coordination, and 
authorities for example – were shortfalls or roadblocks to successful execution. This type 
of structured, but flexible mini-scenario assessment and discussion can also facilitate 
coordination of which organization can most effectively deliver enablers and capabilities 
for prevention. By combining required resources with needed enablers, the cost of each  
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“menu” item can be easily determined and clearly expressed as building blocks in 
capability to facilitate senior decision-makers assessment of where the planner threshold 
should be established. 
 
C. A CAPABILITIES-BASED APPROACH TO RISK VERSUS RESOURCES 
DECISION-MAKING 
While this planning process allows for the identification of resources required at 
each point on blue lines of operation to deliver the needed capabilities, setting the 
planning thresholds allows senior decision-makers to have a deliberate mechanism to 
allocate resources and assess risks. This capabilities-based planning method addresses the 
concerns of the current USNORTHCOM combatant commander by calculating and 
expressing the answers to the two key decisions “what do these resources buy?” and 
“where and how much is an acceptable level of risk for this Plan?” As seen in Figure 11, 
the process of matching threat capabilities and counter capabilities intentionally 
facilitates this decision-making judgment on resources versus risks by expressing the 
“building blocks” of capabilities as requiring a set amount of resources to mitigate the 
risk of the threat capability they are built to counter. When the planned (and resourced) 
threshold is placed to match the most likely assessed level of threat, that amount of 
dedicated resources can be stated as counter that level of risk, as well as less robust threat 
capabilities (i.e., a preventative capability for multiple truck bomb attacks could be 
claimed to address the threat of a single truck or car bomb). However, planners may 
recommend, and decision-makers may select, to either assume a greater degree of risk 
and move the “Planned Capability” threshold to the left (only address lower magnitude 
threat capabilities) or increase the resource commitments to “buy down” risks of less-
























 “What do these resources buy?”















Figure 13.   Assessing Resource Levels and Risks. 
 
As seen in the simple graphic above, this planning method addresses one of the 
major challenges by providing a formal mechanism to simplify complex contingency 
plans for presentation to senior decision-makers. By overlaying threat lines of operation 
(“Red Lines”) with preventative lines of operation (“Blue Lines”), this can be done 
without oversimplifying resource and risk decisions or confusing the linkage between 
assessed threats and planned counters. While the intelligence assessment will determine 
the most-likely threat level and the placement of the red diamond on a threat line of 
operation, this approach appropriately places the decision of establishing the planned 
capability threshold or blue diamond where it belongs – in the hands of senior decision-
makers. But unlike more traditional approaches to HLD and HLS planning, now this 
decision is better facilitated and the risk versus resources trade-offs better understood and 
expressed. 
With reliance on plans expressed as capabilities and on graphically comparing 
likely threat capabilities and possible methods of attacks with friendly capabilities to 
counter them, this approach also can be used to identify and mitigate mismatches in 
capabilities. As depicted in Figure 13, this is conceptually as basic as comparing likely 
threat capabilities and available prevention capabilities. Where no counter capabilities 
exist, mitigating long-term risks require investment and research strategies to develop 
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what is required. Once the red lines and blue lines are compared to determine other 
shortfalls, mitigation strategies can also be developed on short-term risks. There are three 
possible ways to address capabilities mismatch: increase preventive capabilities (move 
“Blue Diamond” to the right), degrade / attack threat capabilities (force “Red Diamond” 
to the left), or accept risk for threat capabilities (identified as short term shortfalls). The 
important take away from the analysis portrayed in Figure 13 is that this approach allows 


















Figure 14.   
                                                






 Short term capability shortfall through risk mitigation strategy




















While these examples are simplified, the entire process is conceptually 
straightforward and the outcome is a method to develop and present contingency 
planning to senior decision-makers. Once the capabilities-based plan is complete, the 
result is a solution framework emphasizing “building blocks” of capabilities that have 
been planned out, resourced, and wargamed and that could be tailored to meet persistent 
general threats or a specific emerging threat.40 This allows the choice of specific or 
comprehensive responses to threat warnings. If a single threat emerges or threat warning 
is received concerning a single threat line of operation (such a warnings of a hijacking or 
warnings of attacks involving aircraft), a single line of operation (“air defense”) can be 
 
40 This “building block” approach is addressed as a key element in capabilities-based planning in Paul 
K. Davis, Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission Systems Analysis, and 
Transformation (RAND Corporation Publication MR 1513, 2002), 4. 
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conducted to counter this specific threat. However, if the threat is more comprehensive, 
such during a war overseas or a period of vulnerability such as a major military 
deployment of forces, a more wide-ranging posture can be executed to counter all 
possible threat capabilities.  
This capabilities-based approach to planning introduces both flexibility and 
adaptability by helping planners define a menu of capabilities needed rather than 
numerous individual solutions to narrowly defined, highly scripted scenarios. 
Capabilities-based planning treats the threat as a continuum, within prescribed limits, 
rather than as a set of single-point values. This highlights one weakness in the concept: a 
more specific intelligence warning is intrinsically required to determine the “where” and 
the “when” of the threat attack and the detailed tactical planning of where counter 
capabilities need to be executed. However, often intelligence warning can provide some 
narrowing information in enough of a timely manner to adjust deployment of resources 
and tailor capability packets to that specific set of circumstances. These capabilities 
packages could also provide a general deterrence value by demonstrating an ability to 
counter threat lines of operations. The end result is a “menu” of options to prevent and 
defeat attacks that is comprehensive and comprehensible because it is expressed as a list 
of potential lines of operation against the threat and a list of specific capabilities required 
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IV. CASE STUDIES: THE ADAPTABILITY OF A CAPABILITIES-
BASED CONTINGENCY METHODOLOGY 
After the terror of September 11th, the world has become a very dangerous place 
for soldiers on the front lines in the War on Terror and for first responders protecting the 
homefront. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism recognized this new threat 
environment of terrorism, the “Axis of Evil,” and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) by stating, “The struggle against international terrorism is different 
from any other war in our history. We will not triumph solely or even primarily through 
military might.”41 In this new threat environment, military commands inside the US and 
even fire fighters and police have seen the need to develop plans and capabilities to 
address terrorism. “Within a few hours [on September 11th], the threats to our world had 
become exponentially more complex,” the New York City Fire Commissioner concluded 
in the FDNY Strategic Plan 2004-2005, “the Fire Department, in turn, needed to adapt.”42  
The challenge for Homeland Defense and Homeland Security organizations is 
uncertainty as what to adapt to, with the threat being too ambiguous and diverse to clarify 
needed changes. In expressing the variety of threats facing the US, the National Strategy 
for Homeland Security (NSHLS) states, “Homeland security is focused on terrorism in 
the United States…Terrorists can be U.S. citizens or foreigners, acting in concert with 
others, on their own, or on behalf of a hostile state.”43 For military planners at United 
States Northern Command, counter-terrorism planners at the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), and strategic planners in police and fire departments, there are many 
questions: What exactly is the threat? What part of this threat is our responsibility? What 
capabilities will we need to detect and to stop these threats? The next concern is often the 
perplexing question: “how do I explain this plan to my boss?” To address these crucial 
questions, all agencies involved in Homeland Defense and Homeland Security should 
adopt a process to express which threats they must counter and what possible threat 
capabilities are involved.  
                                                 
41 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Government Printing Office, February 2003), 1. 
42 Fire Department of New York City, FDNY Strategic Plan 2004-2005 (New York City Fire 
Department, January 1, 2004), ii. 
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43 National Strategy for Homeland Security (Government Printing Office, July 2002), 2. 
This chapter will address practical case study examples of HLS and HLD 
planning by demonstrating how two different agencies, one military and one non-military 
could adapt and adopt the proposed capabilities-based approach to contingency planning 
explained in the last chapter. The first case study will illustrate how military planners at 
the naval component of US Northern Command could use capabilities-based planning for 
a maritime HLD campaign plan. The second case study will reveal how non-military 
planners at a HLS agency such as the New York City Fire Department could use this 
capabilities-based planning approach to build a contingency plan for protecting their city. 
By showing how this approach can be utilized by both Homeland Defense (HLD) and 
Homeland Security (HLS) organizations, the flexibility and adaptability of capabilities-
based planning will be demonstrated. 
These case studies will reinforce how the “menu” approach of capabilities-based 
planning provides more flexibility than any threat-based or scenario-based alternatives 
for Homeland Defense and Homeland Security contingency planning. The requirement 
for this adaptability and flexibility in planning and resourcing was demonstrated when the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security stressed having “Foster Flexibility” as a guiding 
principle for Homeland Security.44 These two case studies will show that very diverse 
agencies can use a capabilities-based approach to planning to define and codify 
amorphous threats and develop a list of required capabilities, authorities, and policies to 
counter anticipated terrorist actions while being inherently flexible to changes in their 
threat environment. 
 
A. HOMELAND DEFENSE CASE STUDY: US NAVAL COMPONENT OF 
US NORTHERN COMMAND 
The most important purpose and highest priority for the Department of Defense 
(DOD) is the defense of the Homeland against external threats and foreign aggression.  In 
this core mission, DOD is responsible for Homeland Defense (HLD) which is defined as, 
“the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical 
                                                 
44 U.S. Department of Homeland Security. National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHLS), July 
2002 (Washington, DC.: US Government Printing Office, 2002), 4. 
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infrastructure against external threats and aggression.”45 While DOD requires capabilities 
to detect and defeat external threats and aggression anywhere in the world, DOD’s goal 
will continue to be to deter and defeat threats as far from the Homeland as possible. 
Should deterrence fail, DOD requires a defense that is proactive, externally focused, and 
conducted in depth beginning at the source of the threat. The transit of threats to the 
Homeland from their source to their target presents DOD a series of opportunities to 
detect, deter, prevent, or defeat threat attacks and avoid the requirement to mitigate their 
effects. This layered defense approach to Homeland Defense includes a maritime defense 
pillar that protects US coastline and territorial waters from external threats including 
transnational terrorism. 
The military organization responsible for the mission of maritime defense is US 
Naval Component of US Northern Command called US Navy North or “NAVNORTH.” 
NAVNORTH is a 4-star Navy headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia. The NAVNORTH 
commander is dual-hatted as the Combined Fleet Forces Commander and in this role is in 
charge of training all US Navy crews and units assigned to ports in the continental US. 
The primary mission of NAVNORTH is Maritime Defense, defined as Homeland 
Defense operations taken to detect, deter, defeat, or nullify maritime threats against US 
territory, domestic population and infrastructure. While a full-scale maritime invasion of 
the homeland is unlikely, maritime forces under NAVNORTH’s command may be 
employed to conduct offensive Homeland Defense operations when directed by the 
President and active and passive defenses in depth operations to deter and counter 
maritime attacks within US territorial waters. As the designated Joint Force Maritime 
Component Command for USNORTHCOM and the lead operational headquarters for 
Maritime Homeland Defense (where DOD is the lead federal agency), NAVNORTH also 
coordinates operations with the US Coast Guard (USCG) who is the lead operational 
agency for Maritime Homeland Security (with DHS as the lead federal agency) and port 
security.  
 
                                                 
45 Definitions for Homeland Defense mission sets are from the final coordination draft of Joint Pub 
3.26 Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security, dated 26 March 2004. 
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One of the main challenges facing NAVNORTH is the need for formal 
contingency planning against irregular maritime threats. After decades of threat-based 
planning against known navies of hostile nation-states, US Navy planners are now faced 
with planning against asymmetric threats. Existing contingency planning processes are 
proving ineffective because expected actions of these terrorist threat actors are vague and 
cannot be templated. With a wide diversity of potential attack scenarios, these planners 
and the leadership at NAVNORTH cannot do a scenario-based approach to maritime 
defense planning. The capabilities-based process may solve this challenge by providing 
the methodology to conduct a formal threat assessment based on threat capabilities and 
develop counters to each possible threat line of operation in the maritime domain. 
An example of a simplified (and notional) capabilities-based threat assessment 
that NAVNORTH could plan for includes the transnational maritime attack threat line of 
operation in Figure 14. This notional line of operation for the threat would be built to 
include all unconventional asymmetric maritime threats aimed at the US Homeland, but 
tailored for the responsibility and role of NAVNORTH and the mission of maritime 
HLD. While each numbered capability point is subject to challenge and dissection by 
NAVNORTH and USNORTHCOM intelligence analysts and leadership, the holistic 
nature of the threat and what needs to be countered are graphically represented and easily 
explained. Intelligence on various threat actors would determine the most likely threat 
threshold as seen by the red diamond depicted at capability D6: “Multiple / coordinated 
hijack ships for kinetic attack with intelligence warning.” This threshold could tell the 
operational planners the magnitude of anticipated threat and which threat capabilities (D1 
– D6) must be planned to counter and well as other potential maritime threat capabilities 
that, while less likely, are still a possible method of attack (D7 – D10). The “transnational 
maritime attack” line of operation (if conducted with actual intelligence available) could 
provide a product that would answer questions on the threat while being flexible to 










EXAMPLE: “Transnational maritime attack” includes all unconventional /    
 asymmetric maritime threats aimed at the US Homeland (includes  terrorism)   
Most Likely
  
Threat    Capability  Parameters:    
•      D1 Sabotage or hijacking of commercial ship at sea, with intel warning  •    D2 Single hijacking of commercial ship for kinetic attack with intel warning
•    D3 Single ship with mines / ATGM / MANPADs, HIV with intel warning  •    D4 Single boat bomb of ship, non-HIV with limited warning  •    D5 Mining of sea lanes, outside port, non-HIV, limited warning   •    D6  Multiple / coordinated hijack ship for kinetic attack with intel warning






























Figure 15.   Capabilities-Based HLD Threat Assessments (Illustrative Purpose 
Only). 
 
Using a capabilities-based threat assessment, maritime planners at NAVNORTH 
would then develop and validate plans and designate resources to counter each predicted 
threat capability. For example, for threat capability D-6 “Multiple / coordinated hijack 
ships for kinetic attack with intelligence warning,” maritime planners could develop 
options for a Capability Force Package. This package could include required forces and 
resources to detect and characterize this threat and for both defense operations and 
offensive maritime intercept operations that could defeat any such threat attack. To 
develop these options, NAVNORTH planners would involve planners from various 
aspects of naval services to address the simple question “what can your command do to 
detect and defeat multiple and coordinated hijack ships the threat would use for kinetics 
attacks if you had some warning?”  
The NAVNORTH Capability Force Package for threat capability D-6 emerge 
would integrate and synergize forces and operations from the tactical units and support 
agencies that could execute contingency operations for NAVNORTH. For example, naval 
aviation planners in the two fleet headquarters under NAVORTH would develop 
reconnaissance plans to detect and track high interest vessels and identify resource 
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requirements of P-3 surveillance aircraft and reconnaissance helicopters and supporting 
ships. Planners from 2nd and 3rd Fleet Headquarters could also answer the “what could 
you do” question by developing a concept of operation for Maritime Intercept Operations 
that identifies required combinations of specific ship types and supporting aviation 
platforms. In this manner, each possible contributor to the contingency mission (Marine 
Forces, Anti-Terrorism agencies, intelligence fusion centers, special operations planners, 
etc.) identifies options for needed capabilities, specifies forces and resource requirements, 
and identifies required enablers to utilize capabilities such as communication networks, 
logistical needs, and draft rules of engagement. Additionally, specialized capabilities that 
could be required such as mine detection platforms are identified and integrated into the 
Capability Package. Once each threat capability is addressed, a menu of options is 
developed for Capability Packages to detect, deter, and if necessary defeat transnational 
maritime attacks. 
When the menu of options is expressed to senior decision-makers at NAVORTH, 
they can make informed decisions on risk versus resources trade-offs. In this example, 
the limited number of specialized P-3 surveillance aircraft and global demands for this 
platform could lead to decisions on the appropriate number to request for maritime 
defense – but only if the threat, required capabilities, possible mitigation substitutions, 
and the impact of any shortfalls on the mission are understood by decision-makers. 
Additionally, for any identified shortfalls in existing capability such as aerial detection of 
nuclear material, NAVNORTH can pass this requirement to USNORTHCOM and the US 
Navy to develop and field new capabilities and devote resources for more effective 
responses in the future. 
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In this case study, the end result of this process is a comprehensive and 
comprehensible Capability Force Package for an anticipated threat attack method like 
“multiple and coordinated hijack ships for kinetic attacks.” Once each threat capability 
and threat line of operation has been addressed, NAVNORTH could share the resulting 
plan and force list with the fleet and task force headquarters that would be executing the 
plan. This would allow the capabilities-based plan to form the basis of exercises and 
wargames to validate and refine contingency plans and force packages. Including the 
threat capability D-6 and draft countering Capability Force Package D-6 into a tabletop 
involving senior leaders at NAVNORTH and 2nd and 3rd Fleets would better prepare the 
entire command for this contingency. Each level of the maritime defense architecture 
would now have a formal and shared mechanism to link risk management, resource 
allocation, and exercises to continually evolve more effective plans to counter possible 
threat attacks. This case study shows how Homeland Defense planning by military 
organizations could be improved with the introduction of a capabilities-based planning 
process. 
 
B. HOMELAND SECURITY CASE STUDY: NEW YORK CITY FIRE 
DEPARTMENT 
While Homeland Defense is the purview of a limited number of Federal military 
commands, Homeland Security is a core mission of security, response, and law 
enforcement agencies at federal, state, and local levels. The National Strategy for 
Homeland Security defines HLS as a “concerted national effort to prevent terrorist 
attacks…” where the “concerted national effort” is based on “the principles of shared 
responsibility and partnership” among various Federal, state, and local agencies and with 
the American people.46 The diverse and ambiguous nature of the terrorist threat is also a 
problem for agencies responsible for HLS, especially for security and law enforcement 
staff responsible for contingency planning in such a difficult environment. This planning 
and resource forecasting task is made all the more challenging because it is an activity 
that must be effectively conducted, and coordinated, at every level of government and by 
diverse agencies.  
While the civilian Homeland Security community does not have a requirement for 
“campaign plans” like military commands such as NAVNORTH, these organizations 
have the equivalent function of contingency planning under the concept of 
“preparedness.” The National Response Plan recognizes the vital nature of pre-event or 
pre-incident planning and defines this key function as: 
Preparedness: The range of deliberate, critical tasks and activities 
necessary to build, sustain, and improve the operational capability to 
prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents. 
inuous process. Preparedness involves efforts at all Preparedness is a cont
                                                 
46 National Strategy for Homeland Security (Government Printing Office, July 2002), 2.  
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levels of government and between government and private sector and 
nongovernmental organizations to identify threats, determine 
vulnerabilities, and identify required resources.47 
This preparedness function serves the traditional purpose of contingency planning by 
providing information, analysis, and recommendations to senior decision-makers to assist 
in the vision and expression of potential courses of action to meet future crises. The 
problem facing various organizations with Homeland Security responsibilities is the need 
to develop contingency plans to utilize existing capabilities in an effective manner against 
a thinking terrorist opponent who seeks surprise and shock. The true test of preparedness 
is whether the agency is ready and able to generate effective actions at the right time and 
place. 
To examine how HLS preparedness planning could be done effectively with a 
capabilities-based approach, the New York City (NYC) Fire Department will form a 
second case study. This large organization faces a broad range of possible terrorism-
related contingencies. The mission of the Fire Department of New York City (FDNY) 
includes preparedness and responding to terrorist events and reads, “as first responders to 
fires, public safety and medical emergencies, disasters and terrorist acts, the FDNY 
protects the lives and property of New York City residents and visitors.”48 Given the size 
of New York City and the enormous amount of commerce involved, this is a challenging 
task even for an emergency response organization numbering over eleven thousand fire 
fighters, twenty-five hundred paramedics and over a thousand support personnel. The 
FDNY leadership has expressed a need to “adapt” to a current and future environment 
that includes a complex threat of terrorism as the main difficulty facing the FDNY.49  
To successfully adjust to the threat environment, a large and complex 
organization like the NYC Fire Department requires effective budgetary and contingency 
planning in order to meet current and future requirements of its many vital, yet diverse, 
missions. For the NYC Fire Department, contingency planning is conducted by the 
                                                 
47 U.S. Department of Homeland Security. National Response Plan (December 2004), 71. 
48 Fire Department of New York City, FDNY Strategic Plan 2004-2005 (New York City Fire 
Department, January 1, 2004), i. 
49 Fire Department of New York City, FDNY Strategic Plan 2004-2005 (New York City Fire 
Department, January 1, 2004), ii. 
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Planning and Strategy unit inside the Department’s Bureau of Operations. Once a team of 
experienced personnel are assigned to a planning task, a plan is developed with input 
from specialists and staffed to the Chief of Department, the Chief of the Bureau of 
Operations, and various other Senior Staff Chiefs before being sent to units to test and 
implement.50 While appearing to be a formal process on paper, much of the actual 
planning has been traditionally done informally with a team from various safety, 
hazardous material, special operations, fire tactics, and medical rescue units meeting to 
address specific problems existing plans fail to address. This ad hoc process faces 
problems in both developing effective plans and in efficiently testing and implementing 
these plans. To be effective in this preparedness task, all these diverse capabilities and 
agencies require a synergizing planning process to coordinate preparedness and 
contingency planning. 
To address this need, the FDNY Strategic Plan 2004-2005 establishes a new 
standard for contingency planning with the key goal to enhance preparedness planning to 
address new threats and complex, long-term challenges. To accomplish this new focus on 
planning, the NYC Fire Department recently established a “Center for Terrorism and 
Disaster Preparedness” inside the Bureau of Operations. This center is the focal point for 
planning teams of experts established to develop, staff, approve, and recommend 
implementation of new plans. The challenge facing these traditional and new agencies is 
how to best prepare for terrorist events: i.e., how should the FDNY respond to a series of 
truck bombs exploding all across the city? Adopting a capabilities-based planning 
approach may help solve this problem by providing a clear method of assessing potential 
threat capabilities and developing a menu of FDNY capability packages to counter 
potential terrorist attacks and Homeland Security incidents. 
A capabilities-based approach to threat assessment could work for HLS-type 
threats where agency responsibilities overlap. An example of a simplified (and notional) 
capabilities-based HLS threat assessment conducted by the FDNY Center for Terrorism 
and Disaster Preparedness can be seen in the transnational threat line of operation 
                                                 
50 This background on contingency planning within the NYC Fire Department came from Ted 
Jankowski, Battalion Fire Chief, Bronx Division, and Executive Officer, Safety Command, New York City 
Fire Department. 
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involving New York City depicted in Figure 15. As this simplified assessment portrays, 
ten threat capabilities are determined to be the potential “how” the enemy might attack 
and the seven lowest magnitude capabilities (N1 – N7) are determined to be the most 
likely. This threshold “red diamond” of assessed probability would be adjusted by the 
FDNY based on intelligence “chatter” or perceived changes in vulnerabilities (for 
example, during a NYC special event). While focusing preparedness planners on the most 
likely threat, this capabilities-based assessment also depicts other, less-likely threats (N8-
N10) that must be addressed in contingency planning due to their greater magnitude and 
potential impact. While greatly oversimplified, these example “red lines” show enough 
assessment of the threat that planners can identify and develop defensive lines of 



















EXAMPLE: “Transnational attack on Continuity of Government” includes  






















Threat    Capability Parameters:    
•  N1   Sabotage to NYC communication node facilities  
•  N2 Multiple assassinations in NYC with 
•  N3 Single Truck bomb in NYC, with High HE) with 
•  N4 Coordinated suicide bombers in NYC, with   
•  N5 Single MANPAD attack in NYC, with 
•  N6 Single Chem attack, in NYC, with 
•  N7 Coordinated shootings /truck bombs in NYC,  
•  N8 Single Chem / RDD n NYC, limited   
•  N9 Coordinated RDD attack, in NYC, limited   
•    N10  Coordinated Chem attack, in NYC, limited   
  
Figure 16.   
                       
A Capabilities-Based HLS Threat Assessments (Illustrative Purpose 
Only). 
 
Using a capabilities-based threat assessment, FDNY preparedness planners in the 
Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness can develop plans and resources to 
counter each predicted threat capability. An example is the potential threat simplified as 
N-7: “coordinated shootings and truck bombs in NYC with limited warning.” In order for 
FDNY planners to develop a counter Capability Force Package options, planners from 
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various agencies inside the FDNY would simply answer the question “what can we do 
about N-7.” In a conference of representatives from the Emergency Management Service 
(EMS) Divisions, the Fire Operations Boro Commands, and specialized agencies like the 
Intergovernmental Affairs and Management Initiatives Agency would identify 
capabilities and operational concepts that could be employed to defeat and mitigate this 
type of terrorist attack. This process would also allow these planners to identify and 
coordinate resources and enablers required to operate during this type of attack by 
addressing what steps should be done and by whom in the event of a warning of a 
“coordinated shootings and truck bombs in NYC with limited warning.”  
The FDNY HLS Capability Package for threat capability N-7 that could emerge 
would integrate and synergize forces and operations from the tactical units and support 
agencies that could execute contingency operations for the Fire Commissioner. For 
example, Fire Battalion Commanders in threatened Boro Divisions could implement asset 
dispersal plans and coordinate truck bomb specific procedures with the NYC Police 
Department. Planners from EMS Division Headquarters could also answer the “what 
could you do” question by developing a concept of operation for truck bombs that 
identifies required combinations of specific EMS vehicle types and supporting personnel. 
Each possible contributor to the contingency mission (FDNY Operational Units, Special 
Operations Command, Logistics and Support, the Bureau of Fire Prevention, etc.) 
identifies options for needed capabilities, specifies units and resource requirements, and 
identifies required enablers to utilize capabilities such as communication networks, 
logistical needs, and security reporting procedures. Additionally, specific specialized 
capabilities that could be required such as explosive disposal teams are identified and 
integrated into the Capability Package. Once each threat capability is addressed, a menu 
of options is developed for HLS Capability Packages to detect, deter, and if necessary 
mitigate coordinated shooting and truck bomb attacks inside NYC.  
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When this menu of options is expressed to senior decision-makers (the Chief of 
Operations and the Chief of Department) and then to the Fire Commissioner, they can 
make informed decisions can be made on risk versus resources trade-offs. In this 
example, the limited number of specialized bomb disposal teams and possible false 
alarms demands for this platform could lead to decisions on the appropriate number to 
train for vehicle-borne explosive devices – but only if the threat, required capabilities, 
possible mitigation substitutions, and the impact of any shortfalls on the mission are 
understood by decision-makers. Additionally, for any identified shortfalls in existing 
capability such as portable incident command and communication vehicles, the Center 
for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness can pass this requirement to the Chief of 
Department and Chief of Operations who would forward this to the department’s Bureau 
of technology and Communications Bureau develop and field new communications 
capabilities and devote resources for more effective multiple incident responses in the 
future.  
A FDNY preparedness plan with identified capability packages could also provide 
a mechanism to validate capability requirements through experimentation. The Chief in 
Charge of the FDNY Bureau of Training could use pre-planned packages for 
“coordinated shootings and truck bombs in NYC with limited warning” as a tabletop with 
the senior leadership of the department to validate options and better prepare for this 
response. Each of the Boro Divisions could also exercise their own developed response 
packages for the contingency N-7 to overcome problems, refine and coordinate plans, and 
identify capability shortfalls within their Boro Fire Battalions and EMS Divisions. For 
any such identified capability shortfalls, NYC elected officials can devote additional 
resources for more effective responses if the risk versus resources tradeoffs are 
formalized and presented in a comprehendible manner.  
This case study shows how the FDNY could use capabilities-based planning to 
overcome HLS challenges in preparedness planning. The FDNY leadership has already 
recognized the need for such a comprehensive and easy-to-understand process. “Since the 
September 11th attack on the World Trade Center, we have been reassessing our missions 
and strategic goals,” the New York City Fire Chief of Department Frank C. Cruthers 
wrote in the FDNY Strategic Plan 2004-2005, “The attacks have given us a new sense of 
urgency to broaden our response capabilities to include terrorism preparedness.”51 To 
meet this test, a capabilities-based planning approach could provide a formal and shared 
                                                 
51 Fire Department of New York City, FDNY Strategic Plan 2004-2005 (New York City Fire 
Department, January 1, 2004), iii. 
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mechanism to link risk management, resource allocation, and response exercises to 
validate choices made during preparedness planning.  
 
C. CASE STUDY IMPLICATION 
As these two case studies demonstrate, a capabilities-based approach to threat 
assessment may serve both Homeland Defense and Homeland Security organizations 
well by facilitating capabilities-based planning and preventing gaps in defense and 
preparedness capabilities. This innovative approach toward developing formalized plans 
for HLD and HLS may be the best approach to what looks more and more like a long war 
versus the threat of terrorism with shrinking distances often placing local and state 
authorities on the front lines. Looking at these notional Homeland Defense and 
Homeland Security case studies, a capabilities-based approach to contingency planning is 
inherently flexible and has the additional advantage of facilitating the planning process 
by ease of comprehension and explanation. Because of the simple nature of this method 
of threat assessment and capability package development, this capabilities-based 
approach to planning can be adapted and adopted in part or in total by any organization 
involved in countering terrorist threats.  
The flexibility and adaptability inherent in a capabilities-based approach to 
planning is also true vertically within organizations. From strategic headquarters to 
operational agencies down to tactical departments and units, all levels within an 
organization can use the same planning process to formalize the passing of threat 
assessments, operational plans, and resourcing decisions up and down organizational 
leadership. Examples will show how this is true for both HLD and HLS. For Homeland 
Defense, NAVNORTH could complete their plan and assign responsibility for a specific 
threat capability to an operational headquarters like Third Fleet to counter capability N4. 
Then, within Third Fleet, the operational agency can further subdivide response 
responsibilities to specific ships and task forces. This would allow planners at all levels to 
share a common language for addressing threats and developing response packages that 
then could be passed to exercise planners to better integrate planning with exercises at 
every level of a military command. 
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A similar process of vertical integration can work for Homeland Security 
organizations. The Emergency Operations Center for New York City can task the FDNY 
to develop plans and capabilities for specific threat capabilities. Inside the FDNY, the 
Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness could then task fire battalions and special 
agencies to address specific threat actions or incident types. In this manner, each part of 
the organization, from the Fire Commissioner to a specific fire station or EMS unit, 
would be integrated in a single preparedness plan. This capabilities-based process can 
also assist HLS preparedness by linking contingency planning to emergency exercises 
wherein the response for threat capabilities is formalized and practiced at each level. As a 
result, this method of preparedness planning could link FDNY, NYPD, and hospitals in 
NYC by sharing a common threat assessment and contingency planning process.  
This conceptual approach to contingency planning could provide an explicit 
linkage process to HLD and HLS arena for contingency planning by allowing for a 
sharing of planning language and methods. The existing overlap of HLS and HLD threats 
mean both military and civilian agencies need to formally address “what could we do 
about threat capability X” in some integrated fashion in order to develop a menu for 
decision-makers. In some cases, responding with a military capability to a specific threat 
or threat group will be appropriate – and in some cases it will clearly not be appropriate. 
As the National Security Strategy concludes, “To defeat this [terrorist] threat we must 
make use of every tool in our arsenal – military power, better homeland defense, law 
enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut of terrorist financing.”52 Ambiguity 
will continually challenge Homeland Defense and Homeland Security planning in the 
current strategic environment by raising the question “what is the threat” when planning 
to confront enemies whose composition and intent are unprecedented. The solution to this 
challenge demonstrated in these case studies can help bridge this seam in planning a 
national response to the threat of terrorism.  
 
                                                 
52 National Security Strategy of the United States (Government Printing Office, September 2002), i. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
To address the challenges of the post-9/11 world, Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld described his way ahead by stating that the leadership of DOD had, “decided to 
move away from the old ‘threat-based’ strategy that had dominated our country's defense 
planning for nearly half a century and adopt a new ‘capabilities-based’ approach -- one 
that focuses less on who might threaten us, or where, and more on how we might be 
threatened and what is needed to deter and defend against such threats.”53 By adopting 
this approach both inside and outside DOD, capabilities-based planning would provide 
senior military decision-makers with an understandable process that has the inherent 
flexibility to address both Homeland Defense and Homeland Security contingency 
planning. Bracketing potential hostile capacities with assumptions of likelihood facilitates 
narrowing planning into manageable (and often affordable and acceptable) realms. 
Amorphous threats such as terrorism can be defined in this way and codified to enable 
planners to develop a list of required capabilities, authorities, and policies to counter 





• DOD should halt the use of a traditional threat-based planning process 
for Homeland Defense contingency planning 
 
While traditional threat-based planning methods and "capabilities-based 
planning" are two equally valid but mutually exclusive planning methodologies, 
traditional military planning only works when you have - and are planning to have - the 
initiative. Capabilities-based planning on the other hand almost inherently assumes you 
do NOT have the initiative and plans on countering threat capabilities and threat actions - 
not actually determining what to do in the absence of a threat action. Capabilities-based 
planning can thus be described as a “countering” methodology for contingency planning 
                                                 
53 Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military,” Foreign Affairs Volume 81, Number 3 
(May/June 2002).  
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and may not be the most effective planning process in areas where the US government 
has the initiative. Both capabilities-based and threat-based approaches to planning have 
roles in current DOD planning, but traditional threat-based planning is really only 
appropriate for the overseas warfights and should not be applied to defense and security 
planning inside the US. 
 
• Both DOD and DHS should adopt a capabilities-based approach for 
threat assessments for Homeland Defense and Homeland Security 
planning 
 
As is required by the defensive mission of protecting the US Homeland, 
capabilities-based threat assessment allows a greater focus on the “how” and not the 
“who” of the threat. While the intelligence community will continue to seek hard 
information on threat groups and key leaders, much of the resulting intelligence data can 
too often cause over-reaction among defense and security planners unless each piece of 
data is integrated into a larger framework. The threat warnings in the months after 9/11 
demonstrated this as nuclear powerplants, airports, ports, trains carrying chemicals, and 
various other targets became the focus of the day. This occurred despite the fact that 
multiple actors who had this capability could have attacked each of these on any day in 
multiple ways. Planners need to focus to identify and define the threat of a truck bomb 
for example; it matters little to defense and security planners which group actually 
recruited the driver and rented the truck. By using a capabilities-based approach to threat 
assessment, the question “who is the threat” is reworded as “what could the threat DO” to 
allow exploration of a much broader range of eventualities and give HLD or HLS 
planners a defined and detailed threat to plan against. This alone would be welcome in 
nearly all contingency discussions on protecting the Homeland against terrorist threats as 






• Both DOD and DHS should adopt a capabilities-based methodology 
for Homeland Defense and Homeland Security contingency planning 
 
Capabilities-based planning combines the strengths of the threat-based and 
scenario-based planning methods while maintaining flexibility. Because of the diffuse 
threat environment and the great probability of the enemy’s use of surprise, Homeland 
Defense planning “requires identifying capabilities that U.S. military forces will need to 
deter and defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare 
to achieve their objectives.”54 Matching means and methods against threat capabilities, 
capabilities-based planning is an effective approach to Homeland Defense planning for 
military planners and non-military Homeland Security planners in today’s ambiguous 
strategic environment. This process can identify required tools and the required 
authorities and policies to utilize them. As the National Security Strategy concludes, “To 
defeat this [terrorist] threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal – military 
power, better homeland defense, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to 
cut off terrorist financing.”55  
 
• Both DOD and DHS should leverage a capabilities-based methodology 
to formalize linkages between planning and resourcing for Homeland 
Defense and Homeland Security contingency planning 
 
Each piece of new intelligence would further refine what threat capabilities exist 
and any “actionable intelligence” would trigger the execution of pre-planned defense and 
security capabilities with required resources already identified and enabled. Secretary of 
Defense Rumsfeld described this concept well when he wrote,  
It's like dealing with burglars: You cannot possibly know who wants to 
break into your home, or when. But you do know how they might try to 
get in. You know they might try to pick your lock, so you need a good, 
solid, dead bolt on your front door. You know they might try breaking 
through a window, so you need a good alarm. You know it is better to stop 
them before they get in, so you need a police force to patrol the 
                                                 
54 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Government Printing Office, 30 
September 2001), 14. 
55 National Security Strategy of the United States (Government Printing Office, September 2002), i. 
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neighborhood and keep bad guys off the streets. And you know that a big 
German Shepherd doesn't hurt, either.56  
While all this may seem common sense (as most quality planning is), a plan’s 
effectiveness is limited by how comprehensive and comprehensible the resulting plans 
and briefings are - whether the plan is to stop burglar or terrorists.57 The proposed 
capabilities-based planning method accomplishes this by producing a menu of options for 
decision-makers that is directly related to specific threat capabilities and linked to 
specific resources. 
 
• Both DOD and DHS should leverage a capabilities-based methodology 
to formalize linkages between planning and exercises for Homeland 
Defense and Homeland Security contingency planning 
 
Because the threat is not contingency-based but rather a steady state, HLD and 
HLS planning needs to be constantly cyclic and remove the clear distinction between 
planning and execution (see Figure 17). Key is to exercise and test the plan in a cyclic 
process. The first step must be the creation (or refinement) of an agreed-upon threat 
assessment that is understood. Next, planners build upon this to develop counters and 
produce a capabilities-based menu of response options. The third step is to allow the 
planning process to facilitate the key resources versus risks decisions by the 
organizational leadership. The final step in the planning cycle is to identify capability 
shortfalls that feed the resources requirement and budget cycle processes and link 
contingency planning with future budgeting. However, operational execution could 
interrupt this planning cycle and test the plans developed. If the plans are tested in real-
world execution (or by exercises), these must be followed by a post-execution assessment 
that can be used to improve and refine contingency plans. 
                                                 
56 Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military,” Foreign Affairs Volume 81, Number 3 
(May/June 2002). 
57 But if the main strength of the system is based on a “tool box” analogy, this is also the main 
weakness. One of the strongest criticisms of capabilities-based planning comes from a National War 
College paper written with the goal of exposing the “myth” of capabilities-based planning. A War College 
student asserts that pure capabilities-based planning would be like outfitting a toolbox with the latest and 
best tools but fails to answer, “how big of a toolbox should you build? How many of each tool do you 
need? How many of these tools need external support in getting to the job at hand?” Additionally, an 
inherent challenge emerges of how do you judge the effectiveness of each tool for a job you have not 
conducted yet. Jeffery B. Kendall, Capabilities-Based Military Planning: A Myth. National War College 
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Capabilities-Based Planning and Execution Cycles. Figure 17.   
 
 
• Both DOD and DHS should leverage a capabilities-based methodology 
to increase senior decision-maker involvement in Homeland Defense 
and Homeland Security contingency planning 
 
One of the fundamental advantages of the capabilities-based planning process is 
the explicit nature of the planning process. In expressing the threat assessment and 
resulting capabilities menu, the planning process can be traced and each step explained. 
Assumptions and choices to be tested and challenged in order to constantly revise, 
update, and improve the contingency plan. This planning process has the ability to better 
integrate senior decision-makers in the process by presenting plans in a comprehensible 
format and allowing iterative involvement at every level of management and across 
different agencies and organizations. Once a framework or “menu” of these capabilities is 
identified, senior decision-makers will recommend for development and if required the 
use of military and security capabilities that best protect the United States. Capabilities-
based planning can fulfill this requirement by formulating plans that can be expressed 
and adapted as both a menu of options and a rheostat of degrees of preventive response – 
67 
all dictated by changes in intelligence warning. This approach to contingency planning 
more than meets the overall DOD objective to overcome uncertainty with flexibility in 
planning.58 The objective is that capabilities-based planning will produce living 
documents with options and branches that are fundamentally different from traditional 
contingency plans. This also can overcome concerns that existing contingency plans 
appear to be detailed rigid plans that fill volumes on the shelf but offer as the only 





                                                 
58  According to current work on DOD Defense Planning Scenario development, “Capabilities-Based 
Planning is a method of Defense planning that examines a wide range of variability in factors, in order to 
achieve a broad portfolio of military capabilities that will perform robustly in an uncertain future 
environment.” This unclassified quote is from a classified DOD briefing dated July 2003 from the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense that accompanied the staffing of the Defense Planning Scenarios.   
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